

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

Buthelezi's emergence as a key national politician in Apartheid South Africa and his decline in status thus far, in the country's democratic context

Rosemary Vickerman (VCKROS002)

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Social Science in Political Studies**

Faculty of Humanities

University of Cape Town

2009

DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Buthlezi's emergence as a key national politician in Apartheid South Africa and his decline in status thus far, in the country's democratic context

Rosemary Vickerman (VCKROS002)

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Social Science in Political Studies**

Faculty of Humanities
University of Cape Town

2009

DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signed by candidate

Signature: _____

Date: 04 February 2009

Acknowledgements

*Thank you to my Mom and
Dad and to Roger Birt and
Campbell Lyons for their
support throughout this
process*

Table of Contents

DESCRIPTIVE ABSTRACT	3
MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	4
INTRODUCTION	9
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	11
THE RESEARCH METHOD	11
THE DATASET ON CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP	12
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	14
CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	15
A REALISTIC AND MODERATE STRATEGY	16
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION	25
PATRONAGE	30
WEBER AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES	35
THE RELEVANCE OF WEBER IN THE TEXT AND CONCLUDING REMARKS	40
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL CHAPTER	41
CHARISMA	41
ETHNICITY	45
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION	48
PATRONAGE	49
CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXTUAL CHAPTER	50
ZULU SOCIETY IN THE PRE-SHAKAN ERA	51
THE SHAKAN ERA AND THE END OF THE ZULU ROYAL HOUSE	54
A MORE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY: STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS DEVELOP	59
STATE SUPPORT OF ZULU NATIONALISM	61
A POLITICAL VACUUM EMERGES	63
THE REBIRTH OF INKATHA (1975)	64
CHAPTER FOUR: MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, THE CHARISMATIC LEADER	73
BUTHELEZI'S ATTEMPT TO FORGE EMOTIONAL TIES	76
BUTHELEZI AND THE LOSS OF PERSONAL WILL	81
THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE NATAL VIOLENCE	82
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF BUTHELEZI'S POSSESSION OF CHARISMA	85
CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN THE DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT	104
CHAPTER FIVE: BUTHELEZI AND ETHNICITY	109
WHY DID BUTHELEZI NEED INKATHA?	109
BUTHELEZI'S ETHNIC MOBILIZATION	111
A SHARED HISTORY	111
WE ARE UNIQUE	114
MOULDING CULTURAL AFFINITY	115
RECRUITING A CONSTITUENCY	115
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: THEN AND NOW	117
ETHNICITY AND CHARISMA	120
CHAPTER SIX: PATRONAGE	120

BUTHIELEZI'S CAREER PROGRESSION AND THE NATURE OF THE HOMELAND OF KWAZULU	120
HOW DID BUTHIELEZI WIN THE LEGITIMACY REQUIRED TO BECOME KWAZULU'S CHIEF BROKER OF PATRONAGE?	125
DEMOCRACY AND PATRIMONIALISM	129
DOES BUTHIELEZI'S PRACTICING OF PATRONAGE SUGGEST THAT HE IN FACT DID NOT HAVE THE ATTRIBUTES OF A CHARISMATIC LEADER DURING THE APARTHEID ERA?	132
CONCLUSION	134
BIBLIOGRAPHY	136

University of Cape Town

Descriptive Abstract

This thesis examines Mangosuthu Buthelezi's emergence as a national leader during the Apartheid era in South Africa and his subsequent decline in status thus far in the country's democratic context. Much of the literature written on Buthelezi's ascent to power focuses on his engagement with the process of ethnic mobilization and on his dispensing of patronage to those who were residing in the homeland of KwaZulu. Whilst attention is given to Buthelezi's involvement with ethnic mobilization and with patronage, the focal point of this study is that of the plausibility of categorizing him as a charismatic leader.

The following questions were asked. Firstly, how was Buthelezi able to successfully mobilize around ethnicity and secondly, how did he gain legitimate access to state patronage? The hypothesis presented in the beginning of this thesis suggests that his charismatic personality assisted him with regards to successfully mobilizing around ethnicity and with that of gaining legitimate access to state resources. Empirical evidence in the form of personal testimonies on the part of Buthelezi's supporters and those others who could comment on the nature of the relationship which appeared to exist between himself and his followers was examined. Based on this evidence it was found that it is indeed plausible to categorize Buthelezi as a charismatic leader. It is argued in the text to follow that Buthelezi's charisma alongside of certain social, political and economic structural conditions which prevailed at the time, worked to facilitate his success as far as ethnic mobilization was concerned. In addition to this, it is argued furthermore that although Buthelezi did engage in patronage politics, his dispensing of material resources or favours cannot be described as the only way in which he obtained loyalty from his supporters.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi: A biographical sketch



Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi was born into Zulu royalty on the 27th of August of 1928 in Mahlabathini¹. His mother, Constance Magogo Zulu, was the daughter of King Dinizulu and granddaughter of King Cetshwayo, his father, Chief Mathole Buthelezi, was the great grandson of Mnyamana Buthelezi, who was Prime Minister to King Cetshwayo². Mangosuthu Buthelezi completed his secondary education from 1944 to 1947 at Adams College in Amanzimtoti, where he matriculated³. From 1948 to 1950 he moved on to study history and native administration at the University of Fort Hare in Alice in the Eastern Cape⁴. His fellow University alumni included renowned political figures such as Oliver Tambo, Govan Mbeki, Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobukwe⁵. The latter formed part of the ANC youth league at Fort Hare, as did Buthelezi⁶.

In 1950 Buthelezi joined other students in protesting against the scheduled visit of Governor General G Brand Van Zyl and for his actions he was expelled from the University⁷.

¹ University of KwaZulu Natal n.d

² Ibid

³ South African History Online n.d

⁴ Ibid

⁵ The Presidency: Republic of South Africa n.d, (Profile of University of Fort Hare)

⁶ Norval 1993, 76

⁷ South African History Online n.d

Despite his expulsion, the University permitted him to attend the necessary lectures and to write examinations⁸. In the period in which Buthelezi completed his tertiary education, Fort Hare was known as the most prestigious black higher education institution in both southern and eastern Africa⁹. It was out of this prestigious academic background that Buthelezi emerged.

From 1951-52 Buthelezi was employed to perform clerical work in the Department of Bantu Administration in Durban¹⁰. The 2nd July of 1952 saw him marry Irene Audrey Thandekile Mzila, who was employed as a nurse and with her he fathered three sons and four daughters¹¹. During this same year he also worked at 'Cowley and Cowley' Attorneys in Durban, where he again undertook clerical work¹². In 1953 he was made acting chief of the Buthelezis' by the Apartheid Government¹³. 1957 Saw him being made the fully recognized chief of the Buthelezi tribe, a position which he still enjoys today¹⁴.

Buthelezi became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the KwaZulu Territorial Authority (KTA) which was situated in Nongoma, in the year of 1970¹⁵. In 1972 the ZTA morphed

⁸ Ibid

⁹ The Presidency: Republic of South Africa n.d (Profile of University of Fort Hare)

¹⁰ Government Communication and Information System 2002

¹¹ South African History Online n.d

¹² Government Communication and Information System 2002

¹³ Mzala 1988, 69

¹⁴ South African History Online n.d

¹⁵ Government Communication and Information System 2000

into the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA)¹⁶. Buthelezi was CEO of the KLA until 1976¹⁷. This assembly afforded the homeland of KwaZulu a limited degree of executive and legislative powers and it received the support of the Apartheid government, as it was viewed as facilitating the eventual move towards an entirely self-governing homeland which the central government desired¹⁸.

On the 21st March of 1975 at KwaNzimela, an area in Northern KwaZulu, the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement was born, with Chief Buthelezi at its helm¹⁹. According to Buthelezi, the majority of those who played a role in the establishment of Inkatha were former African National Congress(ANC) officials or political activists, who on the banning of their organization together with that of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), decided to respond by creating a new organization²⁰. Examples cited of former ANC members who then became part of the group that founded Inkatha include; Dr. Frank T. Mdlalose and the late Rt. Rev. Bishop Dr. A. H. Zulu²¹.

¹⁶ Inkatha Freedom Party 1999 (Biographies)

¹⁷ Government Communication and Information System 2000

¹⁸ Marè and Hamilton 1987, 41

¹⁹ Inkatha Freedom Party n.d (Historical background)

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Ibid

A year after the inception of the second Inkatha, Buthelezi became Chief Minister of KwaZulu, a position he occupied until 1994²².

The 1980's saw Buthelezi being praised abroad and on the receiving end of many an award. In 1981 he received the French National Order of Merit, in 1982 the George Meaney Human Rights Award, 1983 saw him receiving the Apostle of Peace award which was presented by Pandit Satyapal Sharma of India²³. By way of contrast, at home he was labelled as a collaborator to the Apartheid government by many black South Africans in particular, who believed that he was utilizing the Apartheid system and its exploitative devices so as further his own career aspirations²⁴. Buthelezi was both anti-sanctions and anti-unions and in addition to this, he spoke out against armed struggle, all of which members of the United Democratic Front supported (UDF)²⁵. Where Buthelezi argued that the way to topple the Apartheid regime was to work within the confines of the system, the UDF believed that armed struggle was in fact necessary to bring the regime to its knees²⁶.

²² Government Communication and Information System 2000

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Norval 1993, 77

²⁵ Jeffery 1997, 32

²⁶ Ibid

The early 1990's saw Buthelezi representing Inkatha which became known as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in peace talks with the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP)²⁷.

In 1994, after South Africa's first ever democratic election Buthelezi was part of a government of national unity (GNU), Nelson Mandela of the ANC and F.W. De Klerk of the NP were the other constituents of the GNU²⁸. After the 1994 election Buthelezi served as Minister of Home Affairs for two terms and in 1998 he was made acting president by Nelson Mandela, who went to Washington for a Congressional Order²⁹. During Mandela's absence Buthelezi authorized South Africa's military interference in Lesotho so as to stabilize their elected government, which was on shaky ground³⁰. In the period which has followed from this, Buthelezi's party has been securing fewer votes in the country's national, democratic elections and as such, it appears that thus far his status as a national figure is in decline³¹.

²⁷ South African History Online n.d

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Independent Electoral Commission 2004

Introduction

How can we systematically explain Mangosuthu Buthelezi's emergence as a national leader during South Africa's Apartheid era? Why in the country's democratic context thus far, has his status changed? These are the two overarching questions to be addressed in the following text.

Buthelezi captured my interest because of the fact that at one point in South Africa's history he seemed to be loved by a few and hated by many. He was awarded the title of collaborator by some of the UDF supporters because of his choice to operate within the confines of the Apartheid System³². In addition, he was implicated in many of the cases of human rights abuse which came before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and in turn was found to be guilty in some instances. Despite these occurrences he is currently a member of parliament and is treated with a high degree of respect by many of his fellow parliamentarians. It stands out in my mind that there is something about him which gives him such 'staying power'.

Much of the literature which I had read on Buthelezi prior to the completion of this thesis, centred upon the manner in which he had engaged with ethnic manipulation and with the dispensing of patronage to Zulu people. I began thinking about the process of ethnic manipulation and about that which makes it successful.

³² Norval 1993, 77

When reading on this topic, much was said about the nature of those who are susceptible to ethnic manipulation, but very little was written about those who were doing the manipulating. In my mind there must have been something about Buthelezi that made people listen to him and susceptible to manipulation in the first instance, along with the other structural conditions which heightened their susceptibility. It was my belief that Buthelezi was able to engage in successful ethnic manipulation because of his charismatic personality. The purpose of this thesis was to test the before mentioned hypothesis. Could a case in fact be made to support the belief that Buthelezi possessed a charismatic leadership style during South Africa's Apartheid era?

Research Methodology

The Research Method

This thesis examines three key themes these are; charismatic leadership, ethnicity and its manipulation and patronage. These themes are examined in light of the role which each of them played in facilitating Buthelezi's emergence as a key national figure during South Africa's Apartheid era and his subsequent decline in stature, in the country's current democratic context. The core focus of this thesis was that of determining whether or not Buthelezi could be classified as a charismatic leader during the time of Apartheid. Explanations provided in the literature which suggest that he ascended to power as a result of his ethnic manipulation and his use of patronage are plentiful however, very little exists which speaks to Buthelezi's possession of charisma. Where information which speaks directly to Buthelezi's manipulation of ethnicity and his use of patronage is easily obtainable, information relating directly to his use of charisma is not and as such, a more adventurous research strategy was required.

The broad literature on charisma was explored and from this three indicators which provide assistance in the classification of charismatic leaders were identified. These indicators are inclusive of the following; the charismatic leader engenders high levels of trust and loyalty from his/her followers and in addition to this, when the followers are in the presence of the said leader, they lose their own sense of individual will as it becomes synonymous with that of their leader's³³.

³³ Willner 1984, 28-29

With the indicators which could be used to identify a charismatic leader identified, the next step was that of assessing whether or not it was possible to categorize Buthelezi in this way.

In order to determine the level of trust, loyalty and the lack of personal will experienced by Buthelezi's supporters, it was necessary to examine their personal testimonies to extract the required information. Possibly the best way to have obtained this information would have been to interview a sample group of people who supported Buthelezi however, certain limitations prohibited me from undertaking this task. This would have been an incredibly time consuming and expensive exercise given that I would have been the sole person conducting and transcribing the interviews. With these practical constraints in mind the most suitable alternative appeared to be that of sourcing personal testimonies on the part of Buthelezi's supporters or those who could comment on them, in an already existing literary form.

The Dataset on Charismatic Leadership

With the three indicators of charismatic leadership which were obtained from the broader literature on the subject in mind (loyalty, trust, loss of personal will), the next step was that of searching for empirical evidence which would either support Buthelezi's classification as a charismatic leader, or in fact reveal the uncharismatic nature of his leadership. Put differently, was there evidence to suggest that Buthelezi's supporters trusted him, were loyal to him and in addition, experienced a loss of their own personal will as a result of his influence?

It was my contention that I would locate evidence which could support Buthelezi being classified as a charismatic leader in the personal testimonies of those who had been party to some form of violence. During incidents of violence one would assume that one's true loyalties would be exposed in addition to revealing those persons which you deem trustworthy. With this in mind I turned to the literature which spoke to the so-called Natal Violence which occurred during the 1980's and early 1990's. Some of the evidence which was used in an attempt to determine the plausibility of classifying Buthelezi as a charismatic leader was found in the work of Matthew Krentz (1990) in his book entitled, 'An Unofficial War: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg'. Krentz's book examines the violence which occurred in the Pietermaritzburg region during the 1980's in particular. His primary focus is on the people who were affected by the violence and as such, detailed descriptions of events experienced by individuals/groups are given pride of place. The work of John Aitchison, who co-authored a book entitled, 'The role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation', was also examined for evidence to either support or negate the charismatic leadership hypothesis. Aitchison, like Krentz also has much evidence in the way of personal testimony which proved to be useful.

A survey which was conducted by Brewer (1980) in KwaMashu was also examined. The purpose of his survey was to determine the degree to which a congruency existed between the views of Buthelezi and those of his supporters³⁴. A sample group of Zulu males, who possessed legal residential rights in KwaMashu, was taken and multi-stage sampling was performed so as to achieve randomization³⁵. This survey was most useful in that it offered

³⁴ Brewer 1985, 57

³⁵ Ibid, 58

statistical evidence which could speak to the degree to which Buthelezi's supporters had internalized his ideological views.

The literary source which was most utilized for the purpose of attaining empirical evidence which either supported or negated the hypothesis that Buthelezi possessed charisma was that of Volume three, chapter three of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Report (1998). This specific chapter focuses on the Natal violence and detailed descriptions of violent events and of the perceptions of those engaging in the violence are provided in a case by case format.

Limitations of the Study

As mentioned the core focus of this thesis was on the possibility of classifying Buthelezi as a charismatic leader. A number of secondary sources were consulted in a bid to ascertain information which would speak to this. The intention was to make a case for the inclusion of Buthelezi's charismatic leadership style in the explanations which are given for his ascent to power during the Apartheid era and his subsequent decline in status in South Africa's current democratic context.

In no way is the argument being made which suggests that the explanations which focus on Buthelezi's use of ethnic manipulation and of patronage are without merit.

However, what is being suggested is that charisma ought to be considered when offering explanations as to the reasons behind Buthelezi's ascent to power during Apartheid and his subsequent decline in stature in South Africa's democratic environment.

A stronger case for Buthelezi's possession of charisma or lack thereof could have been made if individuals who supported him during the time frame studied in this thesis had been interviewed, however as mentioned, the resources to undertake such a task were unavailable. The task undertaken in this thesis proved to be much smaller. The purpose of this text was that of ascertaining from the literature, whether or not a case could be made for Buthelezi's possession of charisma and in addition, this thesis also sought to determine if the evidence provided would be convincing enough to allow for an alternate explanation of Buthelezi's ascent to power and his subsequent decline in stature to be offered.

Chapter One: Review of the literature

The literature pertaining to Buthelezi's emergence as a key national politician in Apartheid South Africa and on his subsequent decline in the democratic context to retain this status may be divided into three categories. There are those authors such as Butler, Rotberg, Adams, Schlemmer and Muil, who focus on Buthelezi's use of what they perceive to be a realistic and moderate political strategy, to explain his rise to power. Others such as De Haas, Golan, Campbell and Marè, argue that his power emanated from his successful engagement with the process of ethnic mobilization.

The third literary school in the context of this text includes such writers as Berman, Charney and Szeftel. The focus is on the manner in which Buthelezi used both ethnic manipulation and the practice of patronage politics to glean political power.

A realistic and moderate strategy

Butler, Rotberg and Adams in their book entitled, *'The Black Homelands of South Africa'* - (1977), argue that Buthelezi's rise to power was based upon support garnered through his pursuit of a non-violent strategy to create a multi-racial South Africa³⁶. This strategy was based on the following key factors.

Firstly, Buthelezi is described as having effectively utilized the opposition press in particular, to force the government to respond publicly to concerns raised with respect to the policy of separate development³⁷. Mention is made of the fact that Buthelezi was the first African politician to arrange press conferences after he met with the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, or with the Executive Council³⁸. He also wrote a twice monthly column entitled 'Through African Eyes', which appeared in the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), the Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth), the Natal Mercury (Durban), the Cape Times (Cape Town), the Daily Dispatch (East London) and the Sunday Times (Johannesburg), which expressed his political views and kept the question of the credibility of the policy of separate development on the

³⁶ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 78

³⁷ Ibid, 83

³⁸ Ibid

agenda for both black and white individuals³⁹. Emanating from this they claim, was Buthelezi's ability to enter into dialogue with white party representatives, where in their view other black leaders such as Albert Luthuli had failed⁴⁰.

The second part of Buthelezi's strategy concerned that of his refusal to accept independence for KwaZulu partly because of its poor economic situation and its limited land capacity⁴¹. With respect to the land constraints which KwaZulu experienced, the government had agreed to transfer an additional 163 000 hectares to the homeland in its consolidation proposals of 1972 and 1973⁴². The port city of Richards Bay, the lucrative Hluhluwe Game Reserve and Eshowe (former administrative capital of Zululand) were not to be included in the land destined for transfer⁴³. Buthelezi refused to partake in the process of land consolidation as according to him, the Zulu people had not been consulted on the matter and the entire situation suggested *baaskap* and therefore, it was stated that he would not participate to secure the white supremacist ambitions of the Apartheid government⁴⁴. According to this account, Buthelezi was particularly angered by the failure to include Richards Bay in the land to be transferred to KwaZulu and he viewed this as indicative of the government's plan to ensure that KwaZulu would not be a viable state if independent⁴⁵.

³⁹ Ibid, 84

⁴⁰ Ibid, 80

⁴¹ Ibid, 93 & 97

⁴² Ibid, 93

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid, 95

In addition to this, mention was also made of Buthelezi's public outcry which concerned the awarding of non-arable land to black sugar-cane farmers and the transfer of fertile land in KwaZulu, to white sugar-cane farmers⁴⁶. With respect to KwaZulu's economic development, Buthelezi's desire to rid the homeland of the presence of the Bantu Investment Corporation is discussed⁴⁷. This body was tasked with the advertising of businesses in KwaZulu and with the buying and selling of them⁴⁸. Buthelezi saw this body as serving white interests rather than black and he decried the fact that no input from the Zulu people had been permitted with regards to investment in the homeland⁴⁹. In addition, he sought to be able to receive foreign loans for the purpose of developing the homeland in its own capacity, without having to consult Pretoria⁵⁰.

The third aspect of Buthelezi's strategy to improve the quality of life for all black people and to create a multi-racial South Africa concerned education⁵¹. In 1953 the policy of Bantu education was instituted, which required that the first six years of a child's schooling be provided in their own mother-tongue and thereafter classes would be given in a dual-medium format⁵². In 1973, as a result of the high degree of autonomy given to homeland leaders with respect to both the school curriculum and staff composition (not including financial control,

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid, 99

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Ibid, 104

⁵² Ibid, 111

finances gleaned from Pretoria), legislation was passed in KwaZulu which required all students to be taught in English⁵³. The belief was that if students were not taught in English they would not be able to secure for themselves successful employment at a later stage⁵⁴. Buthelezi set about arguing with Pretoria that if those Zulus who were living in urban areas such as Soweto, were in fact citizens of KwaZulu then they should be subjected to KwaZulu legislation, which required that they be taught in English⁵⁵.

According to Butler, Rotberg and Adams, Buthelezi's choice to operate within the Apartheid structures afforded him the opportunity to interact with those who held political sway. His public appearances and the fact that he was operating within the confines of the law translated into the government being unable to approach him in a dismissive fashion⁵⁶. As such, he was able to pursue his strategy of empowering black people step by step, addressing each issue as it presented itself⁵⁷. Attention was given to the support Buthelezi gained not only from black people, but that which he gained from white quarters as he set about placating their fears about imminent black aggression, as a result of white minority rule⁵⁸.

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid, 112

⁵⁶ Ibid, 80

⁵⁷ Ibid, 81

⁵⁸ Ibid, 78

To summarize, these authors argued that Buthelezi's moderate strategy, which they perceived to be that of attaining a multi-racial South Africa through non-violent means, was the reason behind his emergence as a key political figure.

The arguments posited by Butler, Rotberg and Adams speak of Buthelezi in a more sympathetic light. This may be explained by turning to the historical context in which they were writing. Their book was published in 1977 and prior to this time, the ANC had been weakened. As discussed in the contextual chapter, the infiltration of the MK (Military wing of the African National Congress-ANC) structures by the South African Security Forces at Lilliesleaf farm in 1963, put an end to their plan to overthrow the government, the plan was dubbed 'Operation Mayibuye'⁵⁹. In addition to this, many of their influential leaders such as Nelson Mandela were prosecuted and then imprisoned after the Rivonia trials⁶⁰. These events resulted in a political vacuum occurring in South Africa as a result of the weakening of the ANC and it was at this point, that Buthelezi founded Inkatha⁶¹. His moderate strategy in the wake of the ANC's presumed failure appeared realistic and he created an extremely public personality for himself both domestically and abroad⁶².

These authors were writing in the period prior to the 1979 London meeting between Buthelezi and members of the ANC in exile.

⁵⁹ Jeffery 1997, 19

⁶⁰ Norval 1993, 27 & 29

⁶¹ Ibid, 30

⁶² Jeffery 1997, 21

It was after this meeting (discussed in the contextual chapter) that a more concrete divide between Inkatha and the ANC emerged, after which violent exchanges between members of both parties became more frequent and Buthelezi's 'moderate' strategy was publicly challenged⁶³. With respect to this, the non-violent stance of Buthelezi which the authors discuss came under public attack when he was accused of inciting his supporters to attack members of the ANC⁶⁴. In light of information pertaining to Buthelezi which became evident after the writing of their book, their argument is less convincing and remains applicable only in a certain historical context.

Schlemmer and Muil in their book entitled, *'Social and political change in the African areas: A case study of KwaZulu' - (1975)*, argue that Buthelezi's emergence as a key political figure also rested upon his use of strategy, specifically his use of an inclusive strategy⁶⁵. He made appeals to Black Nationalism, calling for homeland unity made manifest through a Union of Black States⁶⁶. In addition to this, he promoted Zulu Nationalism and often made appeals to Zulu kings of old. His political party, Inkatha, was described as espousing the same goals that its predecessor, Inkatha kaZulu, born in the early 1920's did, namely that of fostering Zulu unity and of the cultivation of a sense of responsibility on the part of Zulu people, toward other South African races⁶⁷.

⁶³ Ibid, 32

⁶⁴ De Haas & Zulu 1994, 441

⁶⁵ Schlemmer and Muil, 124

⁶⁶ Ibid, 123

⁶⁷ Ibid

According to them Buthelezi also embraced the ideology of Black Consciousness, which aimed to free the minds of black individuals from white domination⁶⁸. In addition to embracing Black Nationalism, Zulu unity and Black Consciousness, Buthelezi also addressed Coloured and Indian people⁶⁹. The latter is indicative of the eclectic ideology which Buthelezi promulgated. He acknowledged that Coloured people suffered under the Apartheid regime and committed himself to their cause, whilst stating that he was aware of the fact that as groups they possessed their own individual concerns⁷⁰. Buthelezi also included white people in his strategy, regarding this, he made it known that KwaZulu was open to ‘white Zulus’⁷¹.

The authors acknowledged that from certain sectors of the black population, from the black intelligentsia in particular, Buthelezi received much criticism⁷². Some of this criticism emanated from the fact that Buthelezi adopted an anti-disinvestment and striking stance with respect to South Africa⁷³. Buthelezi was made leader of the most fragmented homeland, which was plagued by unemployment and factional fighting⁷⁴. Mention was made of the many appeals that Buthelezi made overseas for investment in KwaZulu and of the manner in which he set about publicly criticising financial disinvestment from South Africa, in a bid to

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid, 124

⁷² Ibid, 114

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Ibid, 111

illustrate dissatisfaction with the South African government⁷⁵. He criticized Zulu workers who engaged in striking activity as he believed that this activity was a disincentive to foreign investment in the region⁷⁶. In addition to the unpopularity that Buthelezi met with from the broader liberation movement, as a result of his anti-financial disinvestment stance, he also received criticism when he called on the South African Police Force to assist him in stabilizing the factional conflict in Msinga in KwaZulu⁷⁷. In this area in particular, factional fighting, which refers to kin loyalties being played out with respect to disagreements over minor issues, occurred frequently⁷⁸. Disinvestment and factional fighting were not the only challenges which Buthelezi faced. Mention was made of the former national government officials' attempts to incite homeland residents and to direct their frustration toward the homeland leaders⁷⁹.

Despite his unpopularity within the broad liberation movement as a result of his anti-disinvestment campaign, his appeal to the SAPF for assistance and the attempts made by certain former government officials to stir up animosity toward him, he nevertheless won a great deal of support through his inclusive strategy⁸⁰. The authors refer to research which was carried out by an advertising research company called, Quadrant, which posed a question

⁷⁵ Ibid, 114

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid, 116

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Ibid, 117

⁸⁰ Ibid, 124

to a sample group of black people in Soweto⁸¹. The question was as follows, ‘Which person do you admire most?’ Buthelezi’s name was mentioned most often⁸². The authors also cite the many public appearances that Buthelezi made where he spoke to crowds of 10 000 or more, who had come to hear his political views as evidence in support of their popularity claim⁸³.

Schlemmer and Muil’s argument pertaining to the success of Buthelezi as a result of his inclusive strategy, like that of Butler, Rotberg and Adam’s is also limited to a particular historical context. Their book was published in 1975 prior to events that were to unfold which would call the sincerity of Buthelezi’s inclusive strategy into question. It may be said that for a short period of time, Buthelezi’s inclusive strategy did provide him with success in that he gained white approval through allaying their fears of possible black retaliation and he gained the support of many black people, as is evidenced by the number of supporters who attended his rallies, by publicly challenging Pretoria with regards to their policies⁸⁴. However, just a short while after the printing of this book in 1975, after the London meeting referred to, violence engulfed the country and his inclusive strategy no longer appeared as inclusive particularly due to the endemic violence which persisted between Inkatha and members of the ANC⁸⁵. It was not his addressing of the discriminatory policies of Apartheid in an ‘issue by issue’ format that resulted in the degree of success he obtained and sustained

⁸¹ Ibid, 120 & 121

⁸² Ibid, 121

⁸³ Ibid, 120

⁸⁴ Schlemmer and Muil 1975, 130 & 120

⁸⁵ Jeffery 1997, 32

for a length of time, nor was it his 'inclusive strategy'. Both of these arguments prove to be limited and they become difficult to sustain in light of the historical developments which occurred after they were published.

Ethnic mobilization

De Haas, Paulus Zulu, Golan, Campbell, Marè and Walker are all in agreement with respect to the belief that Buthelezi utilized the process of ethnic mobilization to garner support. Ethnicity in the context of the texts referred to, is not understood in the primordial sense, rather, ethnic identities are perceived to be socially constructed. Ethnic mobilization is understood to be a process in which ethnicity is made salient, so as to provide the political broker with the necessary power to achieve his/her political ends⁸⁶.

De Haas and Zulu in their article entitled, *'Ethnicity and federalism: The case of KwaZulu/Natal'* - (1994), focus specifically on the manner in which Buthelezi set about creating the situation in which the Zulu nation and Inkatha became synonymous with one another⁸⁷. They describe the manner in which rallies were utilized to extol this message. At these rallies such as the one held in Clermont, Durban in 1986, ceremonial dances such as the reed dance were conducted and posters communicating the way in which Chief Buthelezi was setting about acquiring for the Zulu people more land, homes and working for their freedom

⁸⁶Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 288

⁸⁷De Haas and Zulu 1994, 438

adorned the venue⁸⁸. The presence of the Zulu king alongside of Buthelezi at many of these rallies and at other events sanctioned Inkatha, making membership of alternate opposition movements appear disloyal to the Zulu royal family and to Zulu culture⁸⁹. The extensive press coverage that these rallies received did much to perpetuate the belief that being Zulu translated into you being a member of Inkatha⁹⁰. As one example in support of this, they refer to an instance in which Robin Carlisle, who was the National Secretary of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), spoke of Chief Buthelezi as having a constituency of 6, 000, 000 Zulus⁹¹.

Golan's focus in her journal article entitled, '*Inkatha and its use of the Zulu past*' – (1991), is on Buthelezi's use of a specific reading of Zulu history, so as to build a constituency⁹². In her view the reading of history promulgated by Buthelezi, enabled his engagement with the process of ethnic manipulation⁹³. In support of her argument she refers to Inkatha's revision of the school curriculum in KwaZulu in 1978⁹⁴. A subject known as *Ubunto Botho* (*Good Citizen*) was added to the syllabus⁹⁵. Ubunto Botho was taught for an hour a week to all grade levels⁹⁶. The aim of the subject was to make known to the students the ideology of

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Golan 1991, 114

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Ibid, 120

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ibid

Inkatha and to assist them in understanding the ‘true’ version of history, the version of history espoused by Buthelezi⁹⁷. The texts for Ubuntu Botho were written in Zulu, which Golan suggests resulted in ethnicity becoming salient⁹⁸. She argues that the language of instruction was used as a political tool in South Africa⁹⁹. Regarding this, mention is made of how black people fought to be taught in English as opposed to in their ‘tribal’ languages, so as to secure for themselves better employment opportunities¹⁰⁰. Contrary to the views expressed earlier by Butler, Rotberg and Adams, who claimed that Buthelezi joined in this fight against being taught in the ethnic languages, Golan claims that Buthelezi was in fact assisting the Apartheid state with their policy of separate development, by teaching a subject in Zulu¹⁰¹.

She argues that Shaka and his warrior status received pride of place in the Ubuntu Botho texts¹⁰². His demolition of other tribes was celebrated and he was recognized as heroic for uniting the Zulu people¹⁰³. Emphasis was also placed on the manner in which Inkatha was set to carry on with Shaka’s mission to unite all Zulu people¹⁰⁴. In addition, attention was given in Inkatha’s historical accounts, not just in school texts but also at public gatherings, to individual leaders in Zulu history, thus creating the belief that individuals have the capability

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Ibid, 121

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

to achieve great ends and to change the course of history¹⁰⁵. Buthelezi's focus on teaching Inkatha's version of history in schools from an early age, his referral to great leaders such as Shaka and his heroic nation-building, which Buthelezi revealed would be continued by Inkatha, according to Golan, all did much to create a constituency who were open to ethnic appeals¹⁰⁶.

Campbell, Marè and Walker in their article, '*Evidence for an ethnic identity in the life histories of Zulu-speaking Durban township residents*' - (1995), argue that Buthelezi was able to achieve success with regards to ethnic mobilization, because his reading of Zulu history resonated with desires ordinary people experienced in their personal lives¹⁰⁷. Like Golan, these authors refer to Buthelezi's reading of Zulu history which emphasizes the legendary Zulu warriors such as Shaka in particular, together with Cetshwayo and Dingane¹⁰⁸. In support of their argument, they refer to a series of twenty four open-ended life histories of Zulu people residing in Umlazi Township in Durban in the early 1990's. They claim that all of their respondents were ignorant with respect to being able to provide detailed information on Shaka or on any of the other warriors Buthelezi often referred to¹⁰⁹. However, they point to the fact that these respondents noted that they would like their own children to be taught the reading of history promulgated by Buthelezi, despite the fact that

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 124

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 120

¹⁰⁷ Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 294

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 293

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

they could not offer detailed information on Shaka or Cetshwayo¹¹⁰. Despite the respondent's lack of knowledge regarding the warriors of old, Buthelezi's appeals to a glorious Zulu past resonated in a real way with the everyday lives of ordinary Zulu people, many of whom were poverty-stricken¹¹¹. Buthelezi's 'blazing trail of chiefs and warriors' reminded Zulu people of the time when they were not oppressed and were able to live their lives with dignity¹¹². His reading of history resonated with ordinary people as it referred to a time in which social order and stability reigned and this permitted him to achieve success with respect to the process of ethnic mobilization¹¹³.

The argument posited by de Haas and Zulu, Golan and Campbell et al, which claims that Buthelezi ascended to power through the process of ethnic mobilization is convincing, in that much evidence is provided in support of his involvement with ethnic manipulation. However, their arguments focus on the process of ethnic mobilization and do not in a substantial manner, appear to address the matter of the characteristics of the person who is implementing the process. As such their argument appears to be incomplete. If ethnic mobilization is to be viewed simply as a process that is implemented and which results in the successful acquisition of power, then would we not see more instances of it occurring? Expressed differently, what makes ethnic manipulation successful? Surely the nature of the person who is engaging in ethnic manipulation must feature in the answer to such a question. These authors suggest that Buthelezi became successful through his manipulation of ethnicity

¹¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹¹ Ibid, 293

¹¹² Ibid, 294

¹¹³ Ibid

however; if he was not a charismatic individual would he have been able to achieve success through the process of ethnic mobilization? It is noted that Campbell, Marè and Walker do add somewhat of a qualifier to the process of ethnic manipulation, when they state that the process is successful when claims by the political entrepreneur resonate in some way with those who are being manipulated however, in focusing on the process and those who are being manipulated, they do not appear to address the matter of analysing the nature of the person who is responsible for the implementation of the process in the first place¹¹⁴.

Patronage

Buthelezi and patronage in the South African context

Charney argues in *'Vigilantes, clientelism, and the South African State'* – (1991), that the Inkatha movement, before the onset of democracy in South Africa, represented the 'most comprehensive system of clientelism' in the country¹¹⁵. Clientelism is defined as a phenomenon in which relationships are created between patrons and clients, which are characterized by dependency¹¹⁶. The exchange of goods or protection is offered by the patron to the client, in exchange for obedience or labour¹¹⁷. This kind of relationship may develop inside or outside of public offices¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁴ Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 294

¹¹⁵ Charney 1991, 10

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 9

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Charney 1991, 9

Inkatha is described as a cartel comprising of Zulu chiefs and of urban bosses¹¹⁹. Buthelezi's former control of both the rural areas and of the city townships, together with his possession of a high degree of coercive power, resulted in him having the largest patronage network of all of the African Homelands¹²⁰. According to Charney, the movement's control of travel documents, healthcare, police, pensions, education and flood relief, assisted them in their acquisition of a constituency numbering over a million¹²¹. Inkatha's control of patronage in KwaZulu is cited by him as the primary reason behind the calm which pervaded the area at a time when the rest of the country was in revolt after the 1976 Soweto uprisings (see contextual chapter)¹²². During the early 1980's, the high level of support previously enjoyed by Inkatha began to wane¹²³. With respect to this, the political instability of the 1980's, the economic inefficiency experienced as a result of the colour bar together with the implementation of foreign sanctions resulted in capital flight and a foreign debt crisis¹²⁴. These events led to the country experiencing economic regression, which limited the capacity which the state had to continue to supply collaborating patrons with the resources they needed to maintain their clientelistic networks¹²⁵. Emanating from these events, Charney argues, was Buthelezi's move toward the use of coercion in a bid to maintain his constituency, which in turn he suggests, resulted in Inkatha's dwindling support¹²⁶.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 10

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Ibid, 11

¹²⁴ Ibid, 3

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid, 11

Charney's argument proves to be problematic in that he attributes Buthelezi's success solely to his control over a vast network of patronage and to his reliance upon coercive power¹²⁷. Buthelezi's supporters in this context appear to be loyal through fear and the need to attain material resources. He describes Inkatha as a cartel, suggesting that Buthelezi is akin to a 'mob' boss or the like. This reading of him appears to be extremely narrow and superficial. Charney appears to have engaged in a mono-causal fallacy, Buthelezi is a complex figure and to simply assert that he only achieved support as a result of his criminal behaviour and the lack of agency on the part of his supporters is problematic. The majority of the people in South Africa during the time of Apartheid feared the coercive capacity of the NP government, at the same time they were reliant on this same government for employment and access to other resources. However, this did not curb attempts to fight against the status quo and the transition to democracy did eventually occur. To assert that supporters offered loyalty to Buthelezi as they were frozen by fear and committed to him through material need does not appear to be an extremely convincing argument.

The hypothesis which is tested in this thesis is that of whether Buthelezi may be categorized as a charismatic leader, which would assist in explaining his ascent to power. Evidence in support of this claim may also partially explain the success which he enjoyed as far as the process of ethnic mobilization is concerned. Whilst his practice of patronage politics is not discounted, Charney's argument does not appear to explain in an entirely convincing manner, the reasons behind Buthelezi's ascent to power.

¹²⁷ Charney 1991, 10

Szeftel in his journal article, *'Ethnicity and democratization in South Africa'* – (1994), argues against the view that Buthelezi achieved success solely through his engagement with the process of ethnic mobilization¹²⁸. He claims that whilst ethnic mobilization did have a role to play, Buthelezi's control of the patronage structures of KwaZulu ought not to be discounted in attempts to explain his rise to power¹²⁹. Szeftel argues that patron-client relationships in Africa in particular, often times become imbued with ethnic symbols in an attempt to provide leaders with support¹³⁰. He uses the following example to illustrate the manner in which clientelistic relationships assume an ethnic dimension. He refers to the homeland system which existed in South Africa in which elites, while dependent on the state for access to resources, were empowered in that they controlled the patronage network of their specific homeland¹³¹. For the clients of these patrons, obedience to the homeland leaders became the only way in which they were able to secure work, land and other resources¹³². The limited resources and the tight control exercised over them by homeland leaders, particularly with respect to land, resulted in the prevalence of jealousy and resentment around the distribution of these resources¹³³. The awarding of scarce resources took on an ethnic dimension¹³⁴.

¹²⁸ Szeftel 1994, 196

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Ibid, 192

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ Ibid

In KwaZulu it was the case that Zulu councillors were removed from office if they were found to be selling or renting plots to Pondos¹³⁵. In addition, new housing projects were restricted to Zulu people and Pondos were not entitled to be involved¹³⁶. Through Buthelezi's awarding of patronage to Zulu people as opposed to the Pondo in particular, he gained the support of the dominant group residing in KwaZulu¹³⁷. Szeftel concurs that through the dispensing of patronage, ethnicity became more salient as those who were not Zulu were restricted from access to resources¹³⁸. Thus ethnicity became the means by which to determine how important resources would be distributed in KwaZulu. Buthelezi's access to patronage put him in the position to be able to render ethnicity salient in the everyday lives of those residing in KwaZulu¹³⁹.

Szeftel's argument is problematic for the following reason. He argues that ethnicity and patronage are inextricably linked and that patron-client relationships are often imbued with ethnic symbols, so as to grant them legitimacy¹⁴⁰. According to Szeftel, Buthelezi's rise to power rested heavily upon his use of patronage and on that of engaging in ethnic mobilization¹⁴¹. His argument pertaining to the salience of patronage is deterministic in the sense that he asserts that Buthelezi's supporters were driven solely by their material needs.

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ Ibid

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Ibid

¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ Szeftel 1994, 196

¹⁴¹ Ibid

He appears to contradict this claim when he asserts that patron-client relations need to be awarded legitimacy from another source, suggesting that simple resource exchange is not afforded legitimacy and that ethnic symbols need to be used to legitimize exchanges which are made. His argument suggests that Buthelezi's supporters were only offering their loyalty to him for material reward and that in order to make this situation appear 'decent', ethnic sentiments were drawn upon. It reads as economically deterministic. The mere fact that people were of the view that patron-client relations ought to be legitimized in some other way, suggests that Buthelezi's supporters were not limited to thinking only about material reward and believed that a quest purely directed toward personal enrichment was illegitimate.

Weber and his contemporaries

Central to the argument presented in this thesis is the manner in which 'charisma' is conceptualized. With respect to this, Weber's typology of authority will be presented in full, so as to be able to clearly distinguish between the three types of legitimate authority that he spoke of. In addition to this, his assertions about charismatic leadership which are presented in the text entitled, 'Economy and Society (Volume 1)' will be provided. In response to his claims about charismatic leadership, will follow an examination of the ways in which more contemporary writers have interpreted his work on this specific type of authority.

Weber's Typology of Authority

Weber argued that there are three pure types of authority and that claims to this legitimate authority may be based on rational grounds, traditional grounds or on charismatic grounds¹⁴².

1. **Legal Authority:** Normative rules exist and they are believed to be legal. Commands by people who have been placed in positions of authority through the observing of these rules are accepted, as a result of the acceptance of the legality of these rules¹⁴³.

2. **Traditional Authority:** Authority figures have had their positions legitimized by tradition. A belief in the sanctity of established tradition exists and figures of authority attain these positions through the observation of tradition¹⁴⁴.

3. **Charismatic Authority:** Charismatic leaders are heroic in character or they possess some other type of exemplary characteristic¹⁴⁵. Followers are devoted to this unique individual and the normative rules which are promulgated by this person are accepted on these grounds.

Weber's description of charismatic leadership as presented in the book entitled, 'Economy and Society' (1968) reads as follows;

¹⁴² Weber 1947, 300, 301

¹⁴³ Ibid, 300

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 301

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

*'a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader'*¹⁴⁶.

Interpretations of Weber's assertions on charismatic authority

According to Bendix in his book entitled, *'Max Weber: An intellectual portrait'* (1960), Weber conceives of charismatic leadership in the following manner: The charismatic leader practices personal rule as opposed to impersonal rule, which characterises the legal-rational order¹⁴⁷. These leaders emerge in times of crisis by virtue of peoples' belief in their extraordinary physical or mental abilities¹⁴⁸. They may be individuals who are believed to be virtuous such as prophets or doctors, conversely; they may be part of the criminal world¹⁴⁹. The charismatic leader is described as a radical, who challenges the status quo and who addresses the problems at hand in a forthright manner¹⁵⁰. Followers of charismatic leaders no longer obey established rules as they become fully committed to their leader¹⁵¹. He/she retains legitimacy for as long as their followers believe in the mission presented to them by the charismatic leader¹⁵². Charismatic leadership is described as being inherently unstable as

¹⁴⁶ Weber 1968, 241

¹⁴⁷ Bendix 1960, 300

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 299

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 300

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Ibid, 301

it arises in times of crisis, when the crisis ends often times so too will the charismatic leadership¹⁵³.

Peter Lassman (*'The rule of man over man'* - 2000) is in agreement with Bendix and believes that charismatic leaders whether warlords or prophets, due to their possession of the 'gift of grace', are able to obtain absolute trust and devotion from their followers¹⁵⁴. As with Bendix, Lassman notes that a charismatic leader remains as such so long as he/she is able to maintain the support of their followers¹⁵⁵.

Frank Parkin's view (*'Max Weber'* -1982) of the charismatic leader as categorized by Weber, differs somewhat to that of Bendix and Lassman's. He does not emphasize the belief that charismatic leaders may be characterized as non-virtuous individuals. Rather, the manner in which he writes suggests that he views charismatic leaders as virtuous individuals, who have become powerful through their possession of extraordinary gifts¹⁵⁶. He speaks of the need for the charismatic leader to continually perform 'miracles and heroic deeds', so that their divine mission may be legitimized in the eyes of his/her followers¹⁵⁷. Parkin also emphasizes the belief that according to Weber, Charismatic leadership results in the most pure type of legitimacy¹⁵⁸. He claims that the charismatic leader relies solely upon the voluntary support

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ Lassman 2000, 91

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 95

¹⁵⁶ Parkin 1982, 84

¹⁵⁷ Ibid

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

of his/her followers and the case is such that if they choose to no longer support him/her, no negative consequences abound with respect to retribution from the leader¹⁵⁹.

Willner in her book, *'The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership'* (1984), conceives of Weber's understanding of a charismatic leader in the following way. He/she is perceived by their followers to have some type of superhuman characteristics, the followers offer unconditional trust and loyalty to the leader and in addition, their emotional commitment is unqualified¹⁶⁰. She claims that many readings of Weber are erroneous in the sense that they attempt to incorporate unorganized elements which pertain to charisma that Weber wrote of in his numerous texts, into the actual definition of charismatic leadership itself¹⁶¹. She argues that this is problematic because these unorganized discussions around charisma in some of Weber's work, illustrate certain factors which may relate to the concept of charismatic leadership however, they do not define the term¹⁶². The key argument she offers is that information about charismatic leadership should remain separate from the actual definition of it, so as to avoid overloading the concept and in this way rendering it useless¹⁶³. Willner claims that Weber, based on her reading of him, would readily acknowledge the historically contingent nature of his claims as they relate to charismatic leadership¹⁶⁴. From this she concurs that it ought not to be the case that certain of his statements which pertain to

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 85

¹⁶⁰ Willner 1984, 8

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 9

¹⁶² Ibid, 10

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

charismatic leadership, be locked into the actual definition with a complete disregard for history¹⁶⁵. She would be in agreement with Bendix in terms of the view that charismatic leaders may or may not be virtuous individuals¹⁶⁶. The view of Parkin's and of those who share it she discounts and claims that they have not recognized the key elements of Weber's definition of a charismatic leader and have instead focused on issues that he raised, because they were relevant during his particular historical period¹⁶⁷.

The relevance of Weber in the text and concluding remarks

When engaging in discussions pertaining to charismatic leadership, it is imperative to turn to the work of the individual who deciphered the concept. Many different readings of Weber's work on charismatic leadership exist however, despite the differences commonalities do present. The similarities identified in these readings of Weber, provide the platform upon which to test whether or not it is plausible to categorize Mangosuthu Buthelezi as a charismatic leader. It is suspected that when reading the title of the fourth chapter, 'Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the charismatic leader', criticism would immediately abound with regards to him being classified even as a partially charismatic leader. Certainly those who share the view of Frank Parkin and who believe that charismatic leaders are miracle performing prophets, would view this classification of him as problematic, given the often times 'un-virtuous' incidents referred to when discussing his political career.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 12

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 10

This text has been written in accordance with the argument posited by Ann Ruth Willner, which suggests that to restrict the use of the title of charismatic leader to those who are perceived to be virtuous, is to confuse the consequences of charismatic leadership with the actual phenomenon itself¹⁶⁸. That is, charismatic leadership exists independently of the positive or negative consequences which it may result in¹⁶⁹. With this in mind and working with the similarities identified in the different readings of Weber's conceptualization of charismatic leadership (which will be discussed in detail in the conceptual chapter), the question as to how Buthelezi ascended to power is addressed.

Chapter Two: Conceptual Chapter

Charisma

A few of the many readings of Weber's conception of charisma and of charismatic leadership which exist have been discussed in the Literature Review. It is the reading of Weber's work which is advocated by Anne Ruth Willner that will be utilized in the following examination of Mangosuthu Buthelezi's leadership style. As mentioned in the review, Willner is of the opinion that much of the literature on Weber's conception of charisma is problematic in that unrelated pieces of text from his multiple works that relate in some form to charisma have been forced into the actual definition of charismatic leadership itself¹⁷⁰. She argues that just because certain factors may relate to a particular term, this does not automatically mean that

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 12

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

¹⁷⁰ Willner 1984, 9

all of these factors define the concept¹⁷¹. Willner's key assertion is that the definition of charismatic leadership should not be overloaded by information which simply relates to the concept, as this will result in it becoming redundant¹⁷². She argues furthermore that according to her reading of him, Weber would acknowledge the historically contingent nature of his assertions about charismatic leadership¹⁷³. As such, it is her argument that the statements which Weber made which relate to charisma ought not to be forcefully locked into the definition of charismatic leadership, without any attention given to the historically contingent nature of his claims¹⁷⁴.

With the before mentioned factors in mind, the following constitutes the definition of charismatic leadership which will be utilized in this text. A charismatic leader is an individual who through their possession of a superhuman quality wins the loyalty and trust of individuals and as a result of this, these followers experience a sense of the loss of their own personal will¹⁷⁵. From this definition two criteria emerge which may be used to assess individuals in terms of their leadership style. Charismatic leaders would be those who elicit emotional intensity from their followers and who in addition, make the personal will of their followers synonymous with their own.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 10

¹⁷² Ibid

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 28-29

The indicator entitled ‘emotional intensity’ speaks to the depth of feeling emanating from a group of followers with respect to their leader¹⁷⁶. Charismatic individuals are believed to elicit emotions from followers which are powerful¹⁷⁷. The existence of loyalty and of obedience on the part of the followers may also be used to assess the depth of feeling which a group of people experience towards a particular leader¹⁷⁸.

With respect to ‘the loss of personal will’, this refers to the situation in which the individual will of each follower is subsumed into that of the charismatic leader¹⁷⁹. That is, the will of the charismatic leader becomes the will of the followers. The authority of the charismatic is accepted because he/she is believed to possess extra-ordinary qualities¹⁸⁰. The occurrence of a ‘loss of personal will’ on the part of followers may be made more tangible by the following illustration. If the followers believe that something is right simply because the charismatic figure has said that it is, this would count as proof towards proclaiming the existence of a charismatic relationship in that followers no longer differentiate between right and wrong of their own accord but rather, this task is left to the charismatic leader¹⁸¹. Furthermore, if evidence emerges which suggests that assertions made by the charismatic figure are in fact incorrect and the situation is such that despite this, the followers remain convinced that their leader or representative is still correct; this serves to really solidify a particular individual’s

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 27

¹⁷⁷ Popper 2000, 730

¹⁷⁸ Willner 1984, 28-29

¹⁷⁹ Lindholm 1990, 34

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Willner 1984, 25

categorization as that of charismatic figure¹⁸². In addition to this, yet another indicator of the loss of personal will would be that of individuals undergoing extreme hardship so as to remain obedient to their leader¹⁸³. Regarding this, the will to protect oneself is replaced by the dedication to the will of the charismatic leader¹⁸⁴.

Whilst there is much confusion around what the definition of charismatic leadership ought to look like in its entirety, there appears to be a general agreement around some of the factors which ought to be included in the definition. In the texts discussed in the literature review the authors all share the belief that charismatic leaders are characterized by the emotional intensity levied toward them from their followers, as is illustrated by the loyalty afforded to them and in addition, by the manner in which their followers trust them so completely and by so doing, they lose their own sense of personal will. Whilst disagreement abounds in certain areas there is agreement between these authors around the inclusion of the criteria of emotional intensity and the loss of individual will, which will be used in this text, to ascertain the plausibility of categorizing an individual as a charismatic leader. In addition, the criteria which will be used to assess Buthelezi are in no way historically static and may be used in different circumstances and in varying historical contexts.

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ Ibid, 27

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

Ethnicity

In terms of the conceptualization of ethnicity in the social sciences, there exists no literary consensus. Rather, two opposing conceptions of the term present and authors generally appear to adopt one over the other. Dubouw differentiates between ethnicity as conceived of as 'naming' and as that of 'claiming'¹⁸⁵. 'Naming', refers to ethnicity being used in the primordial and static sense¹⁸⁶. 'Claiming' conceives of ethnicity as a part of a social identity which is made meaningful via the process of conscious assertion, as well as through the process of imagining¹⁸⁷. With respect to this latter conception of ethnicity, what exactly does the process of the conscious assertion of ethnicity and its imagining entail?

A heightened awareness of ethnicity comes about via group membership¹⁸⁸. People join groups because human beings are social in nature¹⁸⁹. In addition to this, people come together in a group for disparate reasons which may include; shared biological characteristics, common experiences of inequality within society, or for reasons which are related to the spiritual, psychological or social realms¹⁹⁰. Group membership results in the development of an imagined community¹⁹¹. Regarding this, their common experience unites them despite the fact that they may be strangers to one another and thus a sense of community membership is

¹⁸⁵ Cherry 1994, 630

¹⁸⁶ Ibid

¹⁸⁷ Ibid

¹⁸⁸ Marè 1993, 7

¹⁸⁹ Ibid

¹⁹⁰ Marè 1993, 10

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 7

cultivated¹⁹². Members of groups which are formed around ethnicity share certain characteristics with one another, these characteristics include; cultural similarity; a belief in a shared historical origin and the belief that they possess an ethnic identity which is clearly different to that of other groups¹⁹³.

Cultural similarity is illustrated by the fact that in large groups it is not possible to know all the members of the particular group personally however, the sense of belonging and affinity presents nevertheless¹⁹⁴. Certain symbols come to be representative of a specific group of people, clearly showing them that they belong together¹⁹⁵. Examples of these kinds of symbols may be dress, rituals, language, festivals etc¹⁹⁶.

Regarding the second characteristic of an ethnic group namely that of a shared history, the following may be said. The ethnic group obtains unity and legitimacy from their sense of a shared history and origin¹⁹⁷. The past in fact informs the present identity and ideology of the group¹⁹⁸. Not only does the past provide the group with their current identity, but it also sets in motion an action plan of sorts¹⁹⁹. Past precedents have been set which inform future

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Ibid, 11

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Marè 1993, 12

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 14

¹⁹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 16

activities and in this way, plans of action are instituted²⁰⁰. Those at the helm of enforcing such decisions and who are thus in positions of authority, may also have their positions sanctioned by the past²⁰¹.

The third characteristic of an ethnic group which has been referred to is that of its unique status. A specific group's legitimacy rests on its uniqueness, the ways in which it is different from other groups, be it with respect to language, culture or religion for example²⁰². It is usually the case that groups created on the basis of ethnicity thrive on comparison i.e.: on attempts to prove that one specific group is more superior to another²⁰³.

To clarify, ethnicity in the context of this text is understood to be part of an individual's social identity. It may become more salient if an individual were to join a group which enjoyed a sense of community emanating from their belief in a shared ethnic experience. This group would be characterized by individuals experiencing a cultural affinity with one another, sharing the same belief in their historical origin and in addition, having the common view that they are unique when compared to other groups. It must be noted at this point that the mere existence of groups which are organized around ethnicity, does not mean that ethnic conflict is inevitable²⁰⁴. As Osaghae so aptly puts it, 'it is unusual to find people tearing

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 17

²⁰¹ Ibid

²⁰² Marè 1993, 20

²⁰³ Ibid, 21

²⁰⁴ Osaghae 1994, 3

themselves apart simply on account of coming from different ethnic groups'²⁰⁵. With that said, I turn to the issue of what is meant when using the phrase 'ethnic mobilization'.

Ethnic mobilization

Osaghae argues that ethnic conflicts have been and indeed continue to be the 'Achilles heel' of the post-colonial African state²⁰⁶. However, as previously alluded to, ethnic identities in and of themselves, ought not to be viewed as definite precursors to conflict. This begs the question, why do some ethnic groups receive so much more attention than others and in addition, why is it the case that often these salient, ethnic groups become perpetual sources of consternation? A simple answer to this question is the following. If there are those who are able to benefit in non-ethnic ways i.e. materially or politically for example, from the manipulation of a specific ethnic identity, then a particular ethnic group and the issues surrounding it may become more salient²⁰⁷. If ethnicity can be used as the vehicle to attain power in whichever form it may be the case that it will be manipulated.

Whilst mention has been made of the fact that ethnicity in this context, is understood to be socially constructed, it must be emphasized that the view that ethnic identities are merely created out of nothing and that they are easily 'made up' in social settings is not being

²⁰⁵ Ibid

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 4

²⁰⁷ Marè 1993, 31

espoused²⁰⁸. With respect to this, ethnicity can only be manipulated by political entrepreneurs (those who use ethnicity for personal gain) if the claims which are made by these individuals resonate in some form with the personal and everyday lives of ordinary people²⁰⁹.

Patronage

‘Patronage’ is the term which is used to describe relationships of dependency²¹⁰. In Africa in particular, these types of relationships have developed most often in conditions of inequality and in situations in which large groups of the population are politically disempowered²¹¹. In these types of relationships leaders/patrons provide their followers/clients, who are often impoverished and characterized by powerlessness, with either material goods or with protection in exchange for labour or obedience²¹². Neopatrimonialism as discussed by Bratton and Van der Walle is the concept which is used in the more contemporary situation, but which describes the same kind of dependent relationships which manifest slightly differently in that they occur in bureaucracies²¹³. In these instances public officials utilize

²⁰⁸ Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 289

²⁰⁹ Ibid

²¹⁰ Adam & Moodley 1992, 508

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² Ibid

²¹³ Bratton and Van der Walle 1994, 458

their official position to extract resources, so as to enable them to provide material resources or other favours to their clients in exchange for their loyalty and support²¹⁴.

Chapter Three: Contextual Chapter

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is an extremely complex political figure. He gained prominence in the early seventies and ultimately was awarded the title of Chief Minister of KwaZulu in 1976²¹⁵. Since South Africa's first democratic election in 1994, Buthelezi, the president of the IFP, appears to have experienced a decline in his political power. The popular support given to his party steadily decreased as is evidenced by both national and provincial electoral results. In order to address the question as to why Buthelezi at one point possessed much political power and then to further explain a few of the possible reasons behind his waning power in the democratic context thus far, a historical overview is essential.

Firstly, much of Buthelezi's power in the pre-democratic context was based on the effective mobilization of the Zulu people. His appeals to Zulu history played a pivotal role in his attempts to establish a rapport between himself and this constituency²¹⁶. Buthelezi focused extensively on the Shakan era, the era of Zulu nation-building, when making appeals to history²¹⁷. The purpose of this first section of the historical overview is to provide a reading

²¹⁴ Ibid

²¹⁵ Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) 2002 (Profile information: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Dr)

²¹⁶ Golan 1994, 7

²¹⁷ Ibid

of history, which makes claims about Zulu historiography which are contrary to those expressed by Buthelezi. The reason behind this is to illustrate the view that Buthelezi chose to make use of a particular reading of history, a reading which assisted him in the mobilization of a constituency. The contents of this first section of the historical overview will shed light on the chapter to follow, which discusses amongst other issues Buthelezi's use of history in his crafting of a charismatic persona. The second section of this chapter provides more contemporary contextual information, which assists in establishing the environment in which Inkatha (now the IFP) emerged and it partly describes the manner in which it functioned. This background information is essential with respect to the contents of the chapters to follow.

Zulu society in the pre-Shakan era

Historian James Gump presents a reading of Zulu history which is contrary to that which is espoused by Buthelezi. He refers to the existence of linguistic and archaeological findings which support the claim that pre-Shakan Zululand was populated by a multiplicity of ethnic groupings and that peaceful interaction between these groups of people did occur²¹⁸. In addition to this, Gump reveals that the evidence found suggests that the Zulu language and culture was an amalgam of the languages and cultures of the other ethnic groupings which were to be found in Zululand²¹⁹.

²¹⁸ Gump 1990, 27

²¹⁹ Ibid, 36

The reading of Zulu history promulgated by Buthelezi did not foreground this pre-Shakan period²²⁰. Rather, his reading emphasized the homogeneity of the Zulu ethnic group and its cultural distinctiveness especially with respect to the warrior status which Zulu men possessed²²¹. In addition to this, Buthelezi spoke of only the Zulu people as historically occupying the area which constitutes KwaZulu; this assisted him in rendering his acceptance of the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu in 1976 legitimate²²². In order to reveal the manner in which Buthelezi set about recounting a reading of Zulu history which would be beneficial to him and to illustrate his choice to leave certain elements out of his historical accounts, the work of James Gump, who expresses a different understanding of Zulu history, is examined. No attempt is being made here to locate a 'true history'. Rather, an alternate reading of history is provided so as to be able to compare it with Buthelezi's accounts, in this way revealing how he utilized history to his advantage.

According to Gump, European castaways and the collections by Bryant and John Henderson Soga provide descriptions of this area and of the people who resided there²²³. From this information it appears that Zululand was home to the Xhosa, Tsonga, Khoisan, Nguni and Sotho people²²⁴. Gump argues that whilst it was the case that many different groupings of people presented in the Zululand region, it would seem that a fair amount of interaction

²²⁰ Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 293

²²¹ Ibid

²²² Marè 1992, 64

²²³ Gump 1990, 28

²²⁴ Ibid, 34

occurred between them²²⁵. With respect to this he cites the following example; the Portuguese survivors of the 'Nossa Senhora de Belem' shipwreck noted that they encountered people who both herded cattle and who cultivated millet²²⁶. Cattle herding had commonly been associated with 'Bantu' practice and millet cultivation with Khoikhoi practice, the latter is but one example which he used to illustrate the interaction between the groups²²⁷. Despite the references made to group interaction, Gump points to the existence of three distinct clans in Zululand which had emerged by the seventeenth century. These were the 'Lala' clan (Tsonga-Nguni combination), the 'Mbo-Dhlamini' (Sotho-Tsonga-Nguni amalgam) and the 'Ntungwa' (Nguni people)²²⁸.

According to Gump the Nguni linguistic group, who formed the 'Ntungwa' clan, had come about as a result of their intermingling with the other groupings, who had occupied the Zululand region some time prior to their arrival²²⁹. According to this, their language was based on an amalgam of other languages which possessed a lengthier history²³⁰. The 'Ntungwa' included the Zulu, Khumalo and the Quabe²³¹. Of these sub-groupings it was the Quabe who appeared most powerful²³². By the eighteenth century the Quabe had forced groups related to the 'Lala' clan southwards and they had extended their chiefdom

²²⁵ Ibid, 35

²²⁶ Ibid

²²⁷ Ibid

²²⁸ Ibid, 36

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰ Ibid

²³¹ Ibid, 38

²³² Ibid

substantially²³³. By the time of Shaka the Quabe constituted one of the largest chiefdoms in Zululand²³⁴.

The Shakan era and the end of the Zulu Royal House

Buthelezi often referred to the Shakan era at public gatherings²³⁵. In particular he emphasized the unified status of the Zulu people after Shaka's reign²³⁶. De Villiers Minnaar presents a historical account which differs substantially to Buthelezi's reading of history. He argues that in the period just after Shaka's rule the Zulu people were deeply divided²³⁷. Multiple cleavages presented which related to spirituality and the legitimacy of certain traditional leaders²³⁸. Once again in order to demonstrate the manner in which Buthelezi chose to utilize a specific reading of history which was beneficial to him, it is necessary to examine an alternate account which illustrates the many historical events which Buthelezi chose to omit in his reading of Zulu history.

De Villiers Minnaar states that Shaka, who ruled the Zulu Kingdom from the period of 1816 to 1828, increased his power base by conquering the tribes surrounding his own and by

²³³ Ibid

²³⁴ Ibid

²³⁵ Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 293

²³⁶ Szeftel 1994, 194

²³⁷ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 4

²³⁸ Ibid, 4 & 187

incorporating those individuals who were of use to him into his own Zulu tribe²³⁹. These attacks resulted in social dislocation with people fleeing from the Zulu impis to Natal in particular²⁴⁰. Collectively this wide-spread violence and the abundance of refugees which presented during the time of Shaka became known as the 'Mfecane Wars'²⁴¹. By the year of 1821 Shaka controlled the area from the Phongolo River in the north to the Tongati River in the southern region, as well as from the eastern seaboard to the Drakensberg Mountains in the west²⁴². Whilst tribal chiefs who were not Zulu were permitted by Shaka to govern their people, they were expected to answer to him alone and absolute loyalty to him was demanded²⁴³. In September of 1828 Shaka was assassinated by his personal servant and his two half-brothers, Dingane and Mhlangana²⁴⁴.

De Villiers Minnaar claims that Dingane's rise to power did not usher in a period of peace as was hoped for; instead his rule was described to be as ruthless as Shaka's was²⁴⁵. Dingane turned against his own people as a result of his belief that some of them were being disloyal to him and were insulting him in private²⁴⁶. He punished them violently for this supposed disloyalty and many fled Zululand in fear of him²⁴⁷. This event began the historical process

²³⁹ Ibid, 3

²⁴⁰ Ibid

²⁴¹ Carton 2000, 20

²⁴² De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 4

²⁴³ Ibid

²⁴⁴ Carton 2000, 24

²⁴⁵ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 4

²⁴⁶ Ibid

²⁴⁷ Ibid

of the separation of Zululand from Natal²⁴⁸. White traders who arrived in Port Natal (Durban) in 1824 were asked by the refugees from Zululand for protection from the arbitrary rule enacted by Dingane²⁴⁹. The influence that the white traders and missionaries had on the Zulu people was profound²⁵⁰. Those who sought their protection adopted 'western' values and Christianity (known as the Amakholwa) whilst those who remained in Zululand accepted the authority of the royal house²⁵¹. With respect to this, members of both groupings were characterized by their antagonistic attitude towards those of the 'opposing' group²⁵².

On the 16th December of 1838 Dingane was defeated by the Voortrekkers at the Battle of Blood River²⁵³. In order to provide himself with a scapegoat for this defeat Dingane accused his half brother, Mpande, of treachery and fled²⁵⁴. In 1840 Mpande and the Boers found Dingane and forced him into the north-eastern part of Zululand, where he was killed by a group of African people whom he had harmed politically²⁵⁵. Mpande was pronounced by the Boers as the new leader of the Zulu people²⁵⁶. His reign was not as bloody as that of Shaka's and Dingane's however, he did wish to capture the chiefdoms surrounding Zululand and

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 5

²⁴⁹ Ibid

²⁵⁰ Ibid

²⁵¹ Ibid

²⁵² Golan 1994, 56

²⁵³ Carton 2000, 26

²⁵⁴ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 5

²⁵⁵ Carton 2000, 27

²⁵⁶ Ibid

engaged in raids to this effect, particularly in the areas which lay to the North of Zululand²⁵⁷. Mpande failed to make known who his successor would be and as such the years between 1856 and 1861 were fraught with violent unrest²⁵⁸. Ultimately Cetshwayo, one of Mpande's older sons made it known that he was the rightful heir²⁵⁹. He assumed power only to be defeated by the British in the Anglo-Zulu War, which took place in 1879²⁶⁰. Upon this defeat Cetshwayo was exiled and Zululand was divided into thirteen sub-territories which were placed under the leadership of British appointed 'traditional' chiefs²⁶¹. The three chiefs who held the most power in Zululand were John Dunn, Zibhebhu and Hamu²⁶². These three chiefs in particular created much animosity when they blatantly exploited the dispensation granted to them by the British Government which gave them permission to take cattle and firearms from the Royal house and from those who were attached to it²⁶³. Those who supported the Royal House and who were against these appointed chiefs were known as the Usuthu Faction and they ardently supported Cetshwayo's return from exile²⁶⁴.

In 1880 violence between the Usuthu, Zibhebhu and Hamu factions broke out and northern Zululand found itself in a state of civil war²⁶⁵. In the period between 1881 and 1882 a

²⁵⁷ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 5

²⁵⁸ Ibid 7

²⁵⁹ Ibid

²⁶⁰ Carton 2000, 39

²⁶¹ Carton 2000, 40 & 41

²⁶² Ibid

²⁶³ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 7

²⁶⁴ Ibid

²⁶⁵ Golan 1994, 57

summer drought occurred which it is argued appeared to exacerbate an already explosive situation and in light of this, the British agreed to facilitate Cetshwayo's return²⁶⁶. Although his return was permitted it was not without certain conditionalities. He was to return as chief of the Usuthu people and was no longer permitted to retain the title of King of the Zulus²⁶⁷. His new found status was short lived as on the 29th of March of 1883 Cetshwayo was killed by Zibhebhu in what became known as the Battle of Msebe²⁶⁸.

In response to this battle, Dinuzulu, Cetshwayo's heir, requested the assistance of the Boers to defeat Zibhebhu²⁶⁹. The Battle of Tshaneni which occurred on the 4th June of 1884 saw the latter come to fruition however; the assistance given to Dinuzulu had strings attached²⁷⁰. Dinuzulu had to cede almost the entire western half of Zululand to the Boers in exchange for their assistance²⁷¹. This occupation of such a vast expanse of land by the Boers did not go unnoticed by the British and on the 14th of May they formally annexed the eastern half of Zululand²⁷². Late in the year of 1887 the British informed Dinuzulu and his chiefs that Zibhebhu was to be given permission to operate in the territory previously occupied by him²⁷³. In response to this, Dinuzulu and his supporters fought against Zibhebhu and the

²⁶⁶ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 8

²⁶⁷ Ibid

²⁶⁸ Ibid

²⁶⁹ Ibid

²⁷⁰ Ibid

²⁷¹ Ibid, 9

²⁷² Ibid

²⁷³ Ibid

British forces²⁷⁴. They were not successful and Dinuzulu was sent into exile²⁷⁵. This event was to mark the end of the authority of the Zulu Royal House²⁷⁶. Ten years later in 1897, Zululand as it had been known was no longer and it became formally incorporated into Natal by the British²⁷⁷. From the above it appears that Buthelezi chose to ignore the divided nature of Zulu society both in the Shakan era and in the period following his death in favour of a historical account which spoke of the Zulu people as a unified nation of warriors²⁷⁸.

A more contemporary history: Structural constraints develop

The late half of the 1920's was characterized by an aggressive militancy on the part of the Zulu people²⁷⁹. A shortage of land emerged both in Natal and Zululand as a result of the inception of the Shepstonian system of segregation and the annexation of territory in Zululand by both the British and the Boers²⁸⁰. Land shortages continued to be a structural constraint during the period in which Buthelezi became Prime Minister of KwaZulu²⁸¹. This constraint was utilized by him as a means to garner support and this will be discussed in the chapters on ethnicity and patronage in more detail. A brief historical account of this

²⁷⁴ Ibid

²⁷⁵ Ibid

²⁷⁶ Ibid

²⁷⁷ Golan 1994, 57

²⁷⁸ Szeftel 1994, 194

²⁷⁹ Marks & Trapido 1987, 46

²⁸⁰ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 10

²⁸¹ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 93 & 97

structural constraint is provided in light of the fact that it continued to be of relevance during Buthelezi's rise to power and as mentioned, constituted part of the means by which Buthelezi emerged as a key leader in the politics of Apartheid South Africa.

When the Boers conceded defeat to the British in 1843 and Natal became the sole property of Britain, the task of addressing the large number of black people in Natal came to the fore²⁸². Many Zulu people had fled to Natal during the reign of Dingane which was previously discussed²⁸³. Theophilus Shepstone instituted a system of segregation in Natal in 1845, wherein the approximately 100 000 black people residing in Natal were to be accommodated in designated reserves²⁸⁴. The ground enclosed in these reserves was largely infertile and agricultural activity, the mainstay of those residing in the reserves became extremely challenging²⁸⁵. What is generally termed as 'faction fighting', which refers to violence characterized by kindred loyalties and which is often associated with the pursuit for land became commonplace²⁸⁶. Land scarcity was not only of concern to the Zulu people in Natal, those residing in Zululand were encountering a similar land shortage as the British and Boers had annexed much of the region²⁸⁷.

²⁸² Ibid

²⁸³ Ibid

²⁸⁴ Ibid

²⁸⁵ Ibid, 17

²⁸⁶ Ibid, 19

²⁸⁷ Golan 1994, 56

State support of Zulu Nationalism

State support of Zulu Nationalism which partly facilitated Buthelezi's ascent to power was not limited to South Africa's Apartheid era. Indeed in the later half of the 1920's the militancy of the Zulu people appeared to abate as a large portion of the Natal intelligentsia turned their attention to the development of a 'modernized' Zulu Monarchy²⁸⁸. The state supported this endeavour as it suited their interests²⁸⁹. Not only did the venture gain the support of the state but in addition, sugar barons and those with mining interests sought the successful development of a modern Zulu monarchy²⁹⁰. The latter would be able to appeal to the vast Zulu majority in a way that could potentially cut across cleavages which were evident in the society and would be able to garner 'unified' support²⁹¹. If these groups became allies of the Zulu monarchy, the view was that they may be able to have influence over the Zulu population as a whole. As a means to promote the development of a modern Zulu monarchy, Chief Albert Luthuli established the Zulu Society²⁹². His goal was to have the status of the Zulu king formally recognized²⁹³. The Native Affairs Department financed the Zulu Society until 1946 however, by 1948 the organization ceased to exist²⁹⁴. The lack of

²⁸⁸ Marks & Trapido 1987, 46

²⁸⁹ Ibid

²⁹⁰ Ibid

²⁹¹ Ibid

²⁹² Ibid

²⁹³ Ibid

²⁹⁴ Ibid

militancy during the 1930's and a large portion of the 1940's may be explained by the attention afforded by government to Zulu nationalism²⁹⁵.

In contrast to this, the events unfolding in Alexandra Township, located on the outskirts of Johannesburg, were markedly different to those occurring in Natal. Members of the ANC, which was formed in 1912 and those from the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which came into being in 1921, began large scale protest action in the 1940's against racial discrimination²⁹⁶. In 1940 bus boycotts occurred in the area outside of Johannesburg and in 1943 and 1944 sixty illegal strikes took place²⁹⁷. In addition to this, 1946 saw sixty five thousand mineworkers engaging in striking action²⁹⁸. 1944 Marked the year of the ANC Youth League's inception and in 1949, one year after the National Party's (NP) ascent to power, the movement adopted the Youth League's Programme of Action²⁹⁹. The latter called for the implementation of mass protest campaigns so as to speedily facilitate black liberation³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁵ Ibid

²⁹⁶ Jeffery 1997, 15

²⁹⁷ Ibid

²⁹⁸ Ibid

²⁹⁹ Ibid

³⁰⁰ Ibid

A political vacuum emerges

The historical information which will follow illustrates the manner in which a political space emerged for Inkatha's inception particularly in the later half of the 1960's and early seventies. 1950 saw the enacting of the 'Suppression of Communism' Act³⁰¹. This was passed by the NP government so as to decimate the growing influence that members of the CPSA possessed³⁰². The organization was forced underground and became known as the South African Communist Party (SACP)³⁰³. Some of its members found representation in the ANC, South African Indian Congress and later in the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)³⁰⁴. The latter organization was founded in 1955 and eventually joined forces with the previously mentioned organizations as well as with the Coloured People's Congress to form what became known as the Congress Alliance³⁰⁵.

In this same year the Freedom Charter was drafted and some months later adopted by the ANC³⁰⁶. After non-violent stayaways and striking activities occurred in the late 1950's and in 1960, 1961 saw the birth of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)³⁰⁷. The latter constituted the military wing of the ANC and its inception marked the move away from a focus on passive

³⁰¹ Norval 1993, 50

³⁰² Jeffery 1997, 16

³⁰³ Ibid

³⁰⁴ Norval 1993, 51

³⁰⁵ Jeffery 1997, 16

³⁰⁶ Ibid

³⁰⁷ Norval 1993, 27

resistance toward the adoption of armed struggle³⁰⁸. MK was severely weakened in 1963 when the South African Security Police infiltrated MK structures at the Lilliesleaf farm³⁰⁹. Key players such as Nelson Mandela were prosecuted at the Rivonia trials and the document detailing MK's strategic plans for overthrowing the Apartheid regime entitled, 'Operation Mayibuye', was confiscated³¹⁰. Conditions in MK camps during the early part of the 1970's were squalid and this together with the before mentioned, weakened the morale of the members of MK³¹¹. The ANC alliance diminished in stature as well upon the establishment of organizations espousing the ideals of Black Consciousness (BC)³¹². These BC organizations however enjoyed a short life span as the NP government issued a ban against them³¹³. Morale was generally low in that those who were tasked with being the forerunners of the quest to gain black liberation had seemed to fail. It was at this point that Mangosuthu Buthelezi established Inkatha.

The rebirth of Inkatha (1975)

The first Inkatha was founded by King Solomon in 1923 together with members of the educated Zulu elite such as John Dube, who was the editor of the black newspaper entitled, *Ilanga Lase Natal*³¹⁴. It was an organization established to promote Zulu Nationalism as a

³⁰⁸ Ibid

³⁰⁹ Jeffery 1997, 19

³¹⁰ Norval 1993, 27 & 29

³¹¹ Jeffery 1997, 20

³¹² Norval 1993, 30

³¹³ Jeffery 1997, 21

³¹⁴ Golan 1994, 55 & 56

result of the fear of cultural domination by the British and at a later stage by the Afrikaaners³¹⁵. Many years later a second Inkatha was born. On the 21st March of 1975 at KwaNzimela, an area in Northern KwaZulu, the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement was born³¹⁶. According to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the former Inkatha movement, the majority of those who played a role in the establishment of Inkatha were former ANC officials or political activists, who on the banning of their organization together with that of the Pan African Congress (PAC), decided to respond by creating a new organization³¹⁷.

Prior to the establishment of Inkatha in 1975, its president had already developed an extremely public persona³¹⁸. Buthelezi travelled extensively both domestically and abroad³¹⁹. He met with members of both the ANC and the PAC who were in exile and with African heads of state³²⁰. When travelling, Buthelezi publicly denounced Apartheid. He spoke of the need to be realistic when attempting to topple the regime³²¹. Jeffery argues that according to Buthelezi, Apartheid could only be destroyed through strategic planning and the development of organized constituencies, she claims that he did not believe that armed struggle was the way to set about liberating the country³²². In Jeffery's account she argues that Buthelezi saw

³¹⁵ Golan 1994, 67 & 68

³¹⁶ Inkatha Freedom Party n.d (Historical background)

³¹⁷ Ibid

³¹⁸ Jeffery 1997, 21

³¹⁹ Ibid

³²⁰ Ibid

³²¹ Ibid, 22

³²² Ibid

liberation materializing in the following way; Firstly, Homeland leaders were not to accept independence as this would be tantamount to them assisting in the removal of African participation in South Africa's politics³²³. Buthelezi argued that the reason behind his acceptance of the role of Chief Minister of KwaZulu in 1976 was that of the need to prevent independence being forced upon the Zulu people³²⁴.

Secondly, he believed that the development of a broad based political organization was essential in order to destroy the Apartheid regime³²⁵. He suggested that the ANC and PAC had been destroyed as a result of the detention of certain of their leaders and that in order to avoid this same fate, the development of an organization that had made inroads and rooted itself firmly within black communities was essential³²⁶. This organization would not be able to be ignored by government and would be able to exert pressure upon them³²⁷. It was out of this belief that Inkatha came to be. Membership to Inkatha was initially limited to Zulu people so as to ensure that in its fledgling state the organization would not be banned by government³²⁸. However, two years after its inception, the organization opened its doors to

³²³ Ibid

³²⁴ Norval 1993, 77

³²⁵ Jeffery 1997, 23

³²⁶ Ibid

³²⁷ Ibid

³²⁸ Ibid

all Africans³²⁹. According to Jeffery, Inkatha's membership grew substantially and by 1979, she suggests that Inkatha was the largest black movement in South Africa³³⁰.

The third facet of Buthelezi's strategy to topple the regime was that of avoiding violence at all costs³³¹. Buthelezi pointed to the military might of the regime and argued that liberation would not be found in this way³³². He advocated that negotiations be entered into to bring about liberation in South Africa³³³. To this end, Buthelezi emphasized the need to have a convention in which black liberation leaders would be able to come together to formulate alternatives to Apartheid³³⁴. His view was that it was of no use to fight the liberation cause without some idea as to what Apartheid could be replaced with once liberation had been attained. Buthelezi was a driving force behind the establishment of the South African Black Alliance (SABA) of which Inkatha, the Reform Party (Indian Community), the Labour Party (Coloured representation) and political parties from the Homelands of KaNgwane and QwaQwa were a part³³⁵. The SABA was established so as to promote black unity and in this way facilitate discussions around alternatives to Apartheid³³⁶. He also set up the Buthelezi Commission together with input from the Progressive Federal Party, formerly known as the

³²⁹ Ibid

³³⁰ Ibid, 24

³³¹ Ibid

³³² Norval 1993, 76

³³³ Jeffery 1997, 24

³³⁴ Ibid, 25

³³⁵ Ibid

³³⁶ Ibid

Progressive Party, which was established in 1959 after a split in the United Party occurred³³⁷. In this commission a new constitutional structure for a federal South Africa was formulated, which integrated Natal with KwaZulu.³³⁸

Jeffery argues that the fourth facet of Inkatha's strategy to topple the Apartheid regime was to gain international funding which could be channelled toward the economic development of black people³³⁹. Buthelezi did not support economic sanctions in South Africa as he believed that such policies resulted in an already dire economic situation becoming even worse³⁴⁰. He travelled extensively overseas gaining funding for his anti-Apartheid campaign from countries such as Canada and the United States, which believed that the ANC was under communist leadership and which saw Buthelezi as being more moderate and in line with their ideological beliefs³⁴¹.

Just over a year after the inception of Inkatha, events unfolded in the country which resulted in deep divisions developing between Inkatha and the ANC/SACP alliance³⁴². The South African Student's Organization (SASO), which was established in 1969, promoted the ideology of black consciousness throughout the townships and in the schools³⁴³. Black

³³⁷ Marks & Trapido 1987, 366

³³⁸ Ibid, 376

³³⁹ Jeffery 1997, 26

³⁴⁰ Ibid

³⁴¹ Buthelezi 1979, 69 & 179

³⁴² Jeffery 1997, 26

³⁴³ Ibid

Consciousness played an integral role in the riot which occurred on the 16th June of 1976³⁴⁴. After the shooting of a thirteen year old boy, students violently targeted all symbols of Apartheid³⁴⁵. The rioting against Apartheid was not limited to this day or to this particular community, two months after this event, 160 communities were violently protesting against Apartheid policy³⁴⁶. Stayaways were called by student leaders and those found to be contravening these orders were targeted³⁴⁷. Migrant labourers who did not want to lose their jobs and who did not partake in the stayaways were attacked and their hostels were burnt³⁴⁸. Violence between the hostel-dwellers (many of whom supported Inkatha) and those calling for stayaways erupted specifically in Nyanga in Cape Town and at the Mzimhlope Hostel in Soweto³⁴⁹.

The ANC/SACP alliance believed that the events which had unfolded after June 16th illustrated that armed struggle and violent protest could be sustained and that revolutionary action was possible³⁵⁰. Buthelezi held the opposing view and saw the incidents which had unfolded as a miserable waste of black lives³⁵¹. In order to align the ANC/SACP alliance and Inkatha once again, a meeting between Buthelezi and those leaders of the ANC who were in

³⁴⁴ Norval 1993, 31 & 32

³⁴⁵ Jeffery 1997, 27

³⁴⁶ Ibid

³⁴⁷ Jeffery 1997, 29

³⁴⁸ Ibid

³⁴⁹ Ibid

³⁵⁰ Ibid, 30

³⁵¹ Ibid

London took place in 1979³⁵². At this meeting Buthelezi refused to accede to armed action and to the promotion of economic sanctions on South Africa³⁵³. Divisions manifested from this and from the fact that the proceedings of the meeting were made public, when all involved had agreed that they ought to remain confidential³⁵⁴. Much finger pointing has been done as to who leaked the story to the press with most fingers pointing at Buthelezi however, this has not been proven³⁵⁵. Irrespective of this, the mere fact that the ANC believed that Buthelezi leaked the story and that Buthelezi was faced with animosity toward him from the ANC, resulted in relations between the two organizations deteriorating still further.

The 1980's saw the relationship between Inkatha and the ANC/SACP alliance being characterized by endemic violence³⁵⁶. The introduction of Prime Minister, P.W. Botha's reforms in the early 1980's, which permitted the legal formation of African trade unions, granted municipal power to the black townships, provided Coloured and Indian people with separate chambers of parliament and lifted the racial restrictions on marriage, sex and public accommodation, appeared to be a primary catalyst in the round of anti-Apartheid activism which began in 1984³⁵⁷. The granting of municipal power to the townships resulted in an

³⁵² Ibid, 32

³⁵³ Ibid

³⁵⁴ Ibid

³⁵⁵ Ibid

³⁵⁶ De Haas & Zulu 1994, 441

³⁵⁷ Charney 1991, 3

increase in rent prices owing to the fact that these municipal councils were short of resources and were attempting to increase their revenue in this manner³⁵⁸.

The introduction of the separate chambers of parliament for Coloured and Indian members was met with fierce resistance, as during the period in which individuals were being elected to occupy positions in these chambers, rioting and boycotting occurred.³⁵⁹ In reaction to these occurrences, the government responded by instituting township patrols by police and soldiers and in addition, detentions became common as did house to house searches³⁶⁰. The response of the state ushered in a spate of strikes, violent attacks and boycotts from members of the UDF, an opposition movement comprising of the banned ANC, COSATU and of many civic, youth, women's' and student organizations³⁶¹. In 1985 in response to the ungovernability of the country, the state declared a State of Emergency³⁶². Inkatha members and those of the UDF clashed violently particularly in the areas of Pietermaritzburg and Durban³⁶³.

In March of 1986 the State of Emergency was lifted and violence in this area increased dramatically³⁶⁴. In June of the same year a second State of Emergency was declared in the

³⁵⁸ Ibid

³⁵⁹ Ibid

³⁶⁰ Ibid

³⁶¹ Ibid, 4

³⁶² Ibid

³⁶³ Ibid, 5

³⁶⁴ Ibid

country and this resulted in the curbing of violence in most areas however, bloodshed continued unabated in Pietermaritzburg and in Natal³⁶⁵. The announcement made by F.W. de Klerk on the 2nd of February of 1990, which spoke of the unbanning of the ANC, of plans to free Nelson Mandela as well as of the intention to negotiate a democratic constitution for the country, increased the levels of violence in the country³⁶⁶.

In July of 1990 it was revealed that the government had been funding Inkatha's rallies as well as their workers union, UWUSA (United Workers Union of South Africa)³⁶⁷. This became known as the Inkathagate scandal and resulted in yet another outbreak of violence between members of Inkatha and those of the UDF³⁶⁸. These violent exchanges between the UDF and Inkatha continued throughout the early 1990's, the period in which negotiations between the ANC, IFP (Inkatha became the Inkatha Freedom Party on 14th July 1990) and the NP were occurring³⁶⁹.

According to Sisk during this time, Buthelezi made use of the threat of violence to ensure that he was and continued to be, one of the key players in South Africa's negotiations toward a new democratic dispensation³⁷⁰. Within the negotiation process Buthelezi's key aims were to ensure that minority rights were protected in the new constitution and furthermore, to ensure

³⁶⁵ Ibid

³⁶⁶ Ibid, 6

³⁶⁷ Ibid

³⁶⁸ Ibid

³⁶⁹ Ibid

³⁷⁰ Sisk 1995, 186

that the country would become a federation, which would have permitted him to continue to maintain his constituency in Natal³⁷¹. It was also at this stage that Buthelezi and the NP seriously considered forging a coalition in the future, owing to the fact that they shared common interests³⁷². Both parties sought a federal constitution which protected minority rights, as both knew that in the period following the first democratic election, the ANC would constitute the dominant party³⁷³.

1994 Saw the South African state experiencing its first ever democratic election with the Government of National Unity comprising of the big three negotiating partners, taking the reins of power. Since the first democratic elections in 1994, the NP no longer exists and the IFP has experienced a continual decline in its levels of popular support, which is made manifest through its dwindling number of votes. It is at this point that attention is turned to the question at hand, how did Buthelezi in the pre-democratic context achieve a high degree of political power and why in the democratic context thus far has his power waned?

Chapter Four: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the charismatic leader

The literature review suggests that the explanations of Buthelezi's ascent to power which are provided, do not award sufficient recognition to the central role which he personally played towards achieving this end. Much of the literature makes mention of the success which

³⁷¹ Ibid, 184

³⁷² Ibid, 185

³⁷³ Ibid

Buthelezi enjoyed through the process of ethnic mobilization and as a result of his access to patronage. However, the question as to why Buthelezi was able to successfully mobilize around ethnicity and that of how he managed to legitimately gain access to patronage is not adequately discussed. Regarding this, Campbell, Marè and Walker draw specific attention to the manner in which Buthelezi's appeals to legendary Zulu warriors of old, resonated with the poor who lived in KwaZulu as it reminded them of a time when Zulu people lived with dignity, something which they did not enjoy under the Apartheid regime³⁷⁴. Their explanation of Buthelezi's success with respect to ethnic mobilization, rests heavily on the characteristics of the constituency which he mobilized, as is illustrated by their referral to this group being 'ripe' for manipulation as a result of their poor economic situation³⁷⁵. This text argues that whilst the characteristics of the group which is to be mobilized around ethnicity are of utmost importance to any explanation of successful ethnic mobilization, it would appear that the nature of the individual engaging in the process of ethnic mobilization also warrants attention.

Golan appears to work towards this end with her focus on Buthelezi and the manner in which she believes he set about promulgating a specific reading of history, which assisted him in laying the foundations for successful ethnic mobilization³⁷⁶. However, she does not consider that which afforded Buthelezi the opportunity to have people listen to his reading of history in the first place. Evidence will be examined in this chapter which speaks to the plausibility

³⁷⁴ Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 294

³⁷⁵ Ibid

³⁷⁶ Golan 1991, 114

of categorizing Buthelezi as a charismatic leader, which may provide assistance in explaining why people listened to him in the first place.

As has been mentioned Weber, the pioneer of the concept of charismatic authority conceived of it in the following way;

*'a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader'*³⁷⁷.

When reading this definition of charismatic leadership, Buthelezi may not be the individual who immediately comes to mind as an example of one who possesses extraordinary qualities. However, as Willner argued in relation to understanding Weber, his definition of charisma and that of charismatic leadership ought to be treated as historically contingent³⁷⁸. Viewing Buthelezi as a charismatic leader may be difficult in that Weber cited individuals who were magicians or prophets as those who may be defined as charismatic leaders, as they possessed seemingly 'superhuman' gifts³⁷⁹. Today's world is markedly different to that of Weber's and as such, the manner in which charisma is expressed is also different.

The secularization of the world has resulted in prophets and magicians being replaced by politicians as examples of those who may potentially be charismatic leaders. 'Superhuman

³⁷⁷ Weber 1968, 241

³⁷⁸ Willner 1984, 10

³⁷⁹ Bendix 1960, 299

gifts' are no longer thought of as solely relating to the magical realm and in the contemporary era, they may become manifest in vastly different forms. Mention was also made of the belief that many of the assertions that Weber made which related to charisma and which were limited to a particular historical context, found their way into the actual definitions of charismatic leadership through the works of those who wrote on the topic after him³⁸⁰. This has resulted in much confusion around the relevance of the concept of charismatic leadership in the contemporary context, as through the process of inflating definitions with other assertions made by Weber at a particular time, these definitions have been rendered static and have been unable to transcend a particular historical setting³⁸¹. It is the intention of this text to avoid the latter and to take cognisance of the historically contingent nature of Weber's definition of charismatic leadership. The criteria to be used in the examination of Buthelezi's leadership style were discussed in the conceptual chapter and as such, they will now be applied to Buthelezi to assess the degree to which he conforms to the title of charismatic leader.

Buthelezi's attempt to forge emotional ties

Chief Buthelezi created for himself an image which people could easily come to admire and respect. Traditional Zulu custom holds the belief that chiefs constitute an important link between this world and the world which is supernatural³⁸².

³⁸⁰ Willner 1984, 9

³⁸¹ Ibid, 10

³⁸² Oosthuizen 1981, 3

Chiefs in light of this are traditionally not merely viewed as political figures, but rather they are understood to be symbols of the Zulu nation's state of well being³⁸³. Zulu custom holds that the ancestors and particularly those who were of royal blood use the chief as a vehicle to exercise control over the Zulu nation³⁸⁴. In addition to this, the Zulu king is also believed to be the symbol of the unity of the Zulu people as a whole³⁸⁵. He is the most powerful figure within the Zulu nation³⁸⁶. Buthelezi appeared in traditional Zulu dress and publicised his status as chief at many public gatherings which were also attended by the King of the Zulu people, Goodwill Zwelithini, a nephew of his, at his side³⁸⁷. King Goodwill demonstrated his support for Buthelezi when in 1974 he announced the following, 'I give full support to my Government, led by Chief Buthelezi.....I am just not prepared to become involved in politics'³⁸⁸. The fact that the King of the Zulu people and the symbol of Zulu unity supported Buthelezi and in addition to this, the kinship ties between the two of them assisted him in fostering a degree of tribal legitimacy³⁸⁹. He was thus in the position to be able to recount a proud Zulu history in a public forum, which spoke of the 'God-given' gifts which women had been given with respect to being able to give birth to Zulu children³⁹⁰. In addition, he spoke of Zulu sons who had warrior blood flowing through their veins³⁹¹.

³⁸³ Ibid, 4

³⁸⁴ Ibid

³⁸⁵ Ibid

³⁸⁶ Ibid

³⁸⁷ Adam and Moodley 1992, 500

³⁸⁸ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

³⁸⁹ Ibid

³⁹⁰ Waetjen 1999, 653

³⁹¹ De Haas and Zulu 1994, 437

Waetjen provides an example of Buthelezi's celebration of Zulu warrior prowess when she refers to a statement made by him in May of 1979, at the Anglo Zulu War centenary in Ulundi³⁹². At this event Buthelezi stated the following; 'It is because of (the 1789) resistance that we stand tall today, because although (our people) were conquered through superior arms, this did not mask their bravery in facing the mightiest army in the world with virtually their bare hands'³⁹³. Buthelezi painted a picture of history in which the Zulu 'nation' was superior to others. As a Zulu chief, he was to be both respected and admired. He spoke of the Inkatha movement and of the Zulu nation interchangeably³⁹⁴. Obedience and loyalty to the Zulu culture and to the respected warriors of old such as Shaka, could be made manifest through becoming a member of Inkatha³⁹⁵. De Haas and Paulus Zulu provide an example of the manner in which Buthelezi communicated the idea that Inkatha and the Zulu nation were synonymous with one another. They refer to an instance in Clermont, Durban in 1986, where a Shaka day rally was being held³⁹⁶. Posters displayed at the rally read as follows, 'all proud Zulu's', who were part of a 'mighty nation' and who shared 'a glorious heritage', ought to show their leaders that they were proud of them and that they supported them³⁹⁷.

³⁹² Waetjen 1999, 667

³⁹³ Ibid

³⁹⁴ De Haas and Zulu 1994, 438

³⁹⁵ Ibid

³⁹⁶ Ibid

³⁹⁷ Ibid

The face emblazoned on the posters was that of Chief Buthelezi and the message being communicated was clear, if you were a proud member of the Zulu nation sharing in its heritage, you would support Buthelezi's Inkatha³⁹⁸.

Through his publicising of his status as chief and his emphasis on the kinship ties between himself and King Goodwill Zwelithini, Buthelezi worked towards gaining tribal legitimacy, this permitted him to paint a picture of Zulu history in which the Zulu nation was superior to others and as such, as a legitimate tribal leader of such a superior nation, the case was such that he ought to be admired and respected. Respecting Buthelezi meant being a loyal and obedient member of Inkatha, which was positioned as the political reflection of the entire Zulu nation³⁹⁹.

After the latter assertions, a dispute surrounding the legitimacy of Buthelezi's chieftainship must at least briefly be referred to. With reference to this, he was made acting chief of the Buthelezis by the Apartheid Government in 1953⁴⁰⁰. His elder brother, Mceleli, who was the first born child of Chief Mathole's first wife, believed that it was his right to be chief and that Buthelezi had the backing of the Minister of Native Affairs, with respect to the acquiring of this position⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁸ Ibid

³⁹⁹ Ibid, 26

⁴⁰⁰ Mzala 1988, 69

⁴⁰¹ Mzala, 1988, 69

The dispute between Buthelezi and Mceleli was severe and at one point Buthelezi in fact asked the South African government to protect him from his brother⁴⁰². The government's response to this was that protection would be granted if Buthelezi could show them evidence of his compliance with the Apartheid system⁴⁰³. To this 'request', Buthelezi conceded that he had no intention of working against the system⁴⁰⁴. With respect to this, mention was made in the contextual chapter of Buthelezi's choice to work within the Apartheid state structures⁴⁰⁵. This ultimately did afford him a political platform upon which to publicise himself however, his choice also earned him the title of collaborator as there were those, particularly members of the Black Consciousness (BC) movement which emerged at a later stage, who believed that Buthelezi's only interest was that of self-interest⁴⁰⁶.

He had to do much convincing with respect to proving that he was not going to work against the Apartheid system, in fact only after four years did the Apartheid government believe him to be loyal enough to register him as an official chief⁴⁰⁷. It is argued here that despite the fact that Buthelezi's chieftainship was contested by some, it was accepted by others through the convincing manner in which he publicised himself and therefore, for many he was believed to be a chief sanctioned by traditional Zulu custom, who was therefore fit to lead.

⁴⁰² Ibid, 70

⁴⁰³ Ibid

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid

⁴⁰⁵ Norval 1993, 77

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, 31 & 32

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid, 72

Buthlezi and the loss of personal will

At this point I reiterate the definition of a charismatic leader which is being used in this study. A charismatic leader is an individual who through their possession of a superhuman quality wins the loyalty and trust of individuals and as a result of this, these followers experience a sense of the loss of their own personal will⁴⁰⁸. What evidence is there which speaks to the effect which Buthlezi's charismatic attributes had on individuals? Put differently, were his attempts to create a loyal following successful?

The section to follow examines empirical evidence which speaks to the plausibility of categorizing Buthlezi as a charismatic leader. This evidence is primarily drawn from sources which relate to the so-called 'Natal violence' which occurred during the 1980's and early 1990's. Actions taken by Buthlezi's supporters during this particular time speak to the presence of intense levels of loyalty and trust, which seemingly resulted in a high degree of synonimity between their will and that of Chief Buthlezi's'. Before proceeding with an examination of this evidence alternate interpretations of the causes of the Natal Violence are discussed. It must be noted at this point that in no way is the claim being made that Buthlezi's charisma was the sole reason behind the violence which occurred in Natal during this time. What is being argued however; is that explanations of the causes of the Natal violence ought to include references to Buthlezi's charismatic personality and the effect which it had on his following, so as to make them more comprehensive.

⁴⁰⁸ Willner 1984, 28-29

The motivation behind the Natal Violence

The causes advanced for the violence which occurred in the Natal region from the early 1980's through to the early 1990's are plentiful. Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley in their article entitled, '*Political Violence, 'Tribalism', and Inkatha*' (1992), categorize these explanations of the causes of violence in Natal in the following manner. They distinguish between accounts which focus on leaders/groups and their policies and those which speak to predisposing social conditions⁴⁰⁹. Explanations which emphasize leaders/groups and their policies might focus on the role of the Third Force for example, a group of right-wing individuals located in the government's security force, tasked with covertly destroying peace initiatives or on the role which high ranking Inkatha or ANC individuals played in fuelling the rivalry between the two organizations⁴¹⁰. Moodley and Adam negate these 'single-cause' explanations in favour of a 'less simplistic' discussion around the predisposing social factors which they argue constitute the primary reason behind the violence in the region⁴¹¹. According to them, predisposing social factors include the following; the geographical and generational divide which occurred in the region and the impoverished status of those individuals of colour who resided there⁴¹².

⁴⁰⁹ Adam & Moodley 1992, 485

⁴¹⁰ Ibid

⁴¹¹ Ibid

⁴¹² Ibid

Gavin Woods, who wrote whilst at the Inkatha Institute in Durban, agreed with Moodley and Adam with regards to the role which they believe poverty played in fuelling the violence. However, unlike the former authors his explanation of the violence is more simplified in that he suggests that only the high levels of unemployment amongst the black youth as well as their general state of disaffection led to the violence in the region⁴¹³. Whilst poverty and alienation no doubt have a role to play in the fuelling of conflicts, this explanation of the Natal violence in and of itself does not prove to be entirely convincing. As Matthew Krentridge argued, poverty and alienation were not unique to Natal and many other regions in South Africa could have been categorized in this way⁴¹⁴. However, what was unique to Natal was the intense levels of political violence which occurred between Inkatha and the UDF⁴¹⁵. If poverty was the only cause of the violence in Natal, then surely many other regions in the country would have shared a similar fate, as they too were impoverished.

Richard Steyn, a former editor of the Natal Witness, is also in agreement with Adam and Moodley's point which relates to the role which the generational and geographical differences played in fuelling the violence in Natal. He argues that tension between the older and more traditional Zulus who came from the rural areas and those of the younger and urbanized Zulus, was the reason behind the violence⁴¹⁶.

⁴¹³ Krentridge 1990, 217

⁴¹⁴ Ibid

⁴¹⁵ Ibid

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, 218

He claimed that the older generation of Zulus were vehemently trying to protect their way of life from the youth, who they perceived as disrespectful and irreverent⁴¹⁷. Whilst this generational/geographical explanation of the violence does warrant attention, it in itself is not a convincing explanation. I refer again to Kentridge who argues that within Inkatha it has been the case that members of the Youth Brigade fought together with older members of the organization against the UDF and as such, this explanation is not entirely convincing⁴¹⁸.

Whilst Adam and Moodley's explanation of the violence in Natal is more comprehensive than some of the other accounts which have been provided, in that it encapsulates the role which poverty played in the conflict as well as the effects of the generational and geographical differences, it is not entirely convincing given the criticisms which have been presented and which relate to poverty and the generational/geographical arguments. This thesis proceeds from the view that in order to have an even more comprehensive conception of the reasons behind the violence which occurred in the Natal region, both predisposing socio-economic conditions and the role which individual leaders played in the violence ought to be considered. This text firmly acknowledges the role which socio-economic, structural conditions played in forementing the violence in Natal; indeed these partial explanations cannot be ignored. However, this text and specifically this chapter, concerns itself with a focus on an individual leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and on whether or not he may be classified as a charismatic leader.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid

⁴¹⁸ Ibid

As such, evidence has been sought in the literature on the violence in Natal in an attempt to address this question i.e.; is there evidence in the literature on the violence in Natal which would support Buthelezi's classification as a charismatic leader? When searching for evidence in support of charisma, one would expect to find it in the literature on violence as the emotional status of individuals becomes more exposed in conflict situations. During conflicts one would imagine that loyalties, your own personal will and your levels of trust toward an individual would be more discernable than in other situations.

Empirical evidence in support of Buthelezi's possession of charisma

In order to ascertain whether or not Buthelezi could have been described as a charismatic leader during the Apartheid era, the following sources were studied so as to attempt to obtain empirical indicators which point to the existence of charisma on his part. Firstly, a survey conducted by John D. Brewer in 1980 in Kwamashu, which put to the test the degree to which Inkatha members internalized the views expressed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was examined. Thereafter, attention was given to individual cases which came before the TRC and to evidence in support of Buthelezi's possession of charisma, which was found in the works of Matthew Krentridge and John Aitchison.

Brewer's 1980 Survey

The purpose of the survey undertaken by Brewer was that of attempting to establish the degree of coherency between the views expressed by Buthelezi and those of his followers⁴¹⁹. In order to achieve this, a sample survey of Inkatha membership in the township of Kwamashu was undertaken in 1980⁴²⁰. The sample was reflective of the larger population of Zulu males who possessed legal residential rights in Kwamashu and multi-stage sampling was undertaken so as to obtain randomization⁴²¹. Members of Inkatha were identified by a filter question which asked the respondents which political affiliation they supported⁴²². Those who named Inkatha as the political organisation of choice were asked further questions and those who did not mention that they supported Inkatha functioned as the control group⁴²³.

Brewer refers to the theory of political immunization which suggests that when coherency exists between the opinions of the members of an organization and those enshrined in the organizations official ideology, the levels of loyalty appear higher⁴²⁴. The theory suggests furthermore that when members utilize the ideological categories of the organization or party over a length of time, the loyalty on the part of members to the organization increases still

⁴¹⁹ Brewer 1985, 57

⁴²⁰ Ibid

⁴²¹ Ibid 58

⁴²² Ibid

⁴²³ Ibid

⁴²⁴ Ibid

further⁴²⁵. As has been mentioned in the historical chapter, Buthelezi was considered to be moderate in the early 1980's and he was well known for his commitment to non-violence. When the commitment to non-violence was tested on his support base, the evidence gleaned concurred that they too were in support of a non-violent resistance stance to Apartheid⁴²⁶. 91, 8% Of the sample were against non-violence with the opposition to it being most plentiful amongst Inkatha members⁴²⁷.

Brewer also tested for congruency between Inkatha supporters and Buthelezi with respect to their views on a power-sharing agreement to put an end to Apartheid governance, which would be inclusive of all races. He found that 89, 5% of all Inkatha supporters were supportive of the view on power-sharing which Buthelezi promulgated at this time⁴²⁸. This survey provides empirical evidence to support the claim that Buthelezi's support base shared his views on adopting a strategy of non-violence and that of striving to attain a multiracial power-sharing agreement for a new government. This survey is meaningful in the context of this thesis in that it speaks to a coherency between the will of Buthelezi and those of his followers, with respect to both of the survey questions which were posed an overwhelming majority of his supporters shared his beliefs on these issues. In and of itself although illuminating, the survey is not entirely convincing with respect to establishing the existence of a high level of congruency between the personal will of Buthelezi and the personal wills' of his individual supporters. This survey is only relevant to a specific period in time and this

⁴²⁵ Ibid

⁴²⁶ Ibid, 59

⁴²⁷ Ibid

⁴²⁸ Ibid, 61

places certain limitations on its findings. If more surveys of this kind had been done over time, the findings generated might have been more beneficial as a trend could have come to the fore. However, as no such surveys have been done, I turned to the area in which Brewer's survey had occurred, Kwamashu, and looked at TRC cases which related to this specific location with the hope of finding evidence to suggest that the will of Buthelezi and those of his followers in this area had remained congruent over time.

The testimonies brought before the TRC put into stark relief the references which have previously been made to Buthelezi's non-violent strategy and his followers support thereof. Buthelezi's break with the ANC has been discussed in the Contextual Chapter and his move toward a more violent strategy has in addition been referred to. What is interesting to note here is that as Buthelezi's ideological stance toward the issue of non-violence changed over the years, so apparently did the view of his followers. Those living in Kwamashu who were previously a sample group of a larger number of Zulu individuals, who formerly supported Buthelezi's strategy of non-violence, appeared according to TRC accounts, to have changed their stance on this issue and seemed to have adopted the view that as Zulu people, they needed to protect themselves from the threat of the ANC and its affiliates, even if this meant resorting to violence. The following case is provided so as to offer evidence in support of the assertion which relates to the congruency that appears to exist between Buthelezi's will and the will of his followers.

Cases brought before the TRC

Almost half of the total number of reports which were made to the TRC and which related to gross human rights violations came from the KwaZulu-Natal region⁴²⁹. As such, the proportion of submissions made when compared to the population size of KwaZulu-Natal, indicates that this region had a four times higher gross human rights violation reporting rate than the rest of the country did⁴³⁰. The commission identified Inkatha as a perpetrator of gross human rights violations from the year of 1983⁴³¹. Its findings also included a peak in the violence attributed to Inkatha in 1989 to 1990 and again in 1993⁴³². The majority of the statements made to the TRC in this region related to violence which occurred between supporters of Inkatha and those of the UDF⁴³³.

The AmaSinyora Gang (1980's - early 1990's)

In the Kwamashu township which is situated north of Durban (and which provided Brewer with his sample group), in 1987 the AmaSinyora gang was founded⁴³⁴. This group comprised of Inkatha-supporting vigilantes whose goal it was to oppose UDF-aligned activists in this

⁴²⁹ South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:2

⁴³⁰ Ibid

⁴³¹ Ibid, 3

⁴³² Ibid

⁴³³ Ibid, 5

⁴³⁴ Ibid, 42

specific area⁴³⁵. The TRC found the AmaSinyora gang to be responsible for numerous violent attacks on UDF-aligned activists and they described this group as carrying out a 'reign of terror' from the late 1980's to 1991, evidence brought before the commission also suggested that their violent activities resurfaced in 1994⁴³⁶. A founding member of the AmaSinyora gang, Bheki Mvubu, conceded to the commission that he had burnt eight to ten houses in which UDF affiliates resided and that in addition, he had been part of an attack in which approximately forty UDF supporters had been killed⁴³⁷. Bheki Mvubu also stated that in 1988 he met with Inkatha leader for Lindelani, Thomas Shabalala, who supplied the AmaSinyora with shotguns and bullets and who was very positive with respect to the attacks which they were perpetuating against UDF supporters⁴³⁸. Mr. Shabalala became the AmaSinyora's high ranking contact person and he was approached on multiple occasions for the purpose of attaining money, ammunition and guns⁴³⁹. According to the Human Rights Commission, the AmaSinyora members were implicated in 291 attacks for the period between 1989 and 1990, one hundred of which were killings⁴⁴⁰. The township in which the majority of individuals had previously adopted Buthelezi's strategy of non-violence was now a completely different place. Many were now involved in perpetuating the new strategy which was that of violently eliminating the opposition.

⁴³⁵ Ibid

⁴³⁶ Ibid

⁴³⁷ Ibid

⁴³⁸ Ibid

⁴³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid, 43

The Ongoye Massacre – 1983

On 29 October 1983 five students were killed and many others injured by vigilantes at Ongoye, where Buthelezi was chancellor of the University of the University⁴⁴¹. Those who were harmed had been singing songs which spoke of Buthelezi in a derogatory fashion⁴⁴². Chief Buthelezi had wanted to use the campus as the venue to commemorate the death of King Cetshwayo and certain students protested against this, with some of them singing and speaking of Buthelezi in a derogatory manner⁴⁴³. As a result of this many of these students were assaulted and those who were killed, died from stab wounds inflicted by traditional weapons⁴⁴⁴.

The Sarmcol Strike – 1985

The following case gives testament to the power of Buthelezi's words and how oftentimes it appears that they resulted in violent action. In May of 1985 workers at the BTR Sarmcol Factory near Howick, went on strike⁴⁴⁵. They demanded that their union, the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) be recognized by management⁴⁴⁶. Instead of the recognition

⁴⁴¹ South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:22

⁴⁴² Kentridge 1990, 220

⁴⁴³ South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:22

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, 63

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid

of their union being the result of the strike, they all found themselves unemployed⁴⁴⁷. 970 Workers in total were fired⁴⁴⁸. COSATU created a co-op to assist the fired workers and much pressure was exerted on management by international, regional and local groupings to reinstate the ex-employees⁴⁴⁹. This did not occur and management retained the replacement workers that they had employed⁴⁵⁰. Buthelezi had spoken out against this strike and planned stayaways and stated that owing to his public denouncement of such activity he would view any attempts to forement this type of action as a direct affront to his person⁴⁵¹.

On the 05th of December of 1986 an Inkatha rally was held in the Mphophomeni Community Hall with approximately two hundred Inkatha supporters attending the meeting⁴⁵². After the meeting's conclusion, four well-known MAWU members were abducted and assaulted⁴⁵³. Mr. Phineas Sibiya, Mr. Micca Sibiya, Mr. Simon Ngubane and Ms Flomena Mnikathi were dragged into the community hall where Inkatha members questioned and assaulted them⁴⁵⁴. Thereafter they were forced into a car and taken to Lions River where they were shot⁴⁵⁵. Only Micca Sibiya survived and the remaining others were burnt after they were shot⁴⁵⁶. One

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid

⁴⁵¹ Kentridge 1990, 220

⁴⁵² South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:64

⁴⁵³ Ibid

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid

of the Inkatha members, Mr. Vela Mchunu, was prevented from testifying at the inquest into this attack, by Buthelezi's personal assistant, Mr. MZ Khumalo, who hid him at the Mkhuze camp⁴⁵⁷. Violence relating to Inkatha's anti-union stance continued and further evidence in support of this may be found in the case of Nkosinathi Mjoli amongst many others⁴⁵⁸.

On 17th June of 1990 Nkosinathi Mjoli attended an Inkatha rally at the King Zwelithini Stadium which is situated in Umlazi. Mjoli was wearing a T-shirt with the following words printed on it, 'Workers demand a living wage'⁴⁵⁹. Certain Inkatha supporters inferred that his wearing of this T-shirt meant that he was part of a COSATU affiliated union and they believed him to be a comrade⁴⁶⁰. When the rally concluded Inkatha members confronted Mjoli in the toilet of the stadium and stabbed him to death⁴⁶¹.

'View from the opposition' – 1986

The following evidence presents the manner in which some ANC members saw Buthelezi, with this in turn laying testament to the plausibility of classifying him as a charismatic leader. In 1996 a document was submitted to the TRC by Buthelezi, Dr. Ben Ngubane (former Agricultural and Finance Member of the Executive Council) and Dr. Frank Mdlalose (then

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid, 46

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

⁴⁶¹ Ibid

Inkatha National Chairman), which detailed plans reportedly made by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) to assassinate Buthelezi in 1987⁴⁶². According to this document Reverend Londa Shembe, a former leader of the Church of Nazareth, provided Buthelezi with the details of this assassination plan⁴⁶³. The document revealed that in February of 1986, Shembe had attended a meeting at a hotel in Swaziland at which senior members of MK were present⁴⁶⁴. He claimed that at this meeting, the plans for Buthelezi's assassination in 1987 had been discussed⁴⁶⁵. In a letter which Shembe wrote to Buthelezi in March of 1986 he stated that the ANC had recruited MK commander, Terence Tyrone, who Shembe noted was a 'coloured fellow' to assassinate Buthelezi⁴⁶⁶. He noted furthermore in the letter that 'their opinion is that Your Royal Highness is the only person who can hold Inkatha together and that you cannot be replaced'⁴⁶⁷. They say therefore that if they should succeed, Inkatha would disintegrate'⁴⁶⁸. These last two statements by senior members of MK suggest that even Inkatha's opposition recognized Buthelezi's charismatic appeal. Shembe's claims relating to the existence of a plan to assassinate Buthelezi was corroborated by the director of the Terrorism Research Centre, who claimed that he had obtained information to this effect⁴⁶⁹.

⁴⁶² South African Press Association 1996

⁴⁶³ Ibid

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid

In response to this assassination plan, the clandestine paramilitary training of approximately two hundred Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi region in Namibia occurred⁴⁷⁰. This operation became known as ‘Operation Marion’⁴⁷¹. In September of 1986 the Caprivi trainees went home to both KwaZulu and Natal and they were deployed throughout this region⁴⁷². At the Durban Supreme Court during the KwaMakhutha trial 37 of 1996, evidence emerged which suggested that the Caprivi trainees were responsible for killing in January of 1987 thirteen people, the majority of whom were women and children in the home of UDF leader, Bheki Ntuli⁴⁷³. Furthermore, findings by the commission suggested that the Caprivi trainees took control of Mpumalanga in March of 1989⁴⁷⁴. In this region they performed hit-squad activities as well as in Pietermaritzburg for approximately two years against members of the UDF/ANC⁴⁷⁵. .

⁴⁷⁰ South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1998, Volume 3 Chapter 3:48

⁴⁷¹ Ibid

⁴⁷² Ibid

⁴⁷³ Ibid

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, 52

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid

Evidence found in the work of Matthew Kentridge (1990) and John Aitchison (2003)

The case of Chief Maphumulo – 1983 (Aitchison)

Amongst Buthelezi's support in the KwaZulu government it appears that there was little tolerance for any form of disloyalty to their leader⁴⁷⁶. Evidence of this is provided through the actions taken against Inkatha Chief Hlabunzima Maphumulo of Table Mountain, which is a 'tribal' area located approximately fifteen kilometres outside of Pietermaritzburg⁴⁷⁷. Chief Maphumulo was described as somewhat of a 'maverick chief', made popular by his refusal to toe the party line⁴⁷⁸. Chief Maphumulo had disagreed with Chief Buthelezi on several occasions and had attempted to stop Inkatha from using Table Mountain for their meetings in the early 1980's⁴⁷⁹. Oscar Dhlomo, who was the Secretary General of Inkatha, stated the following in response to Chief Maphumulo's disobedience; 'the full might of Inkatha will be unleashed' against Maphumulo, who was eventually fired with Chief Bangukhosi Mduli replacing him as Chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority⁴⁸⁰. In October of 1983 Chief Maphumulo was severely beaten outside of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade for his 'disrespectful attitude'⁴⁸¹.

⁴⁷⁶ Aitchison 2003, 56

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid

⁴⁷⁸ Kentridge 1990, 165

⁴⁷⁹ Aitchison 2003, 56

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid

⁴⁸¹ Ibid

Peace Talks – 1989 (Kentridge)

The following case provides the personal testimony of Thandeka Gqubule, who attended an Inkatha rally in 1989 and in addition speaks to the violence which emerged after an Imbizo held by King Zwelithini and Buthelezi in this same year, with both of these discussions serving to provide evidence in support of Buthelezi's possession of charisma. In the early half of 1989 proposed peace talks between the ANC, Cosatu and Inkatha gained much publicity⁴⁸². On the 23 of April of 1989 Inkatha organised a number of prayer meetings throughout Natal and the Midlands region⁴⁸³. At these meetings a speech written by Buthelezi was read, which detailed his own peace proposals⁴⁸⁴. He called for international funding to assist in peace processes, the use of technology to assist in broadcasting the negotiations towards peace and the use of peace-keeping field units as well as joint monitoring structures⁴⁸⁵. Buthelezi also agreed that he would be willing to work together with the UDF and Cosatu, so as to reach an agreement around a plan to institute peace in the region⁴⁸⁶. Cosatu and the UDF responded favourably and produced a document in lieu of this entitled, *'An End to Violence and Peace in Natal – the Position of Cosatu and UDF affiliates'*⁴⁸⁷. They noted that 'We share with Inkatha a common view and commitment to a mass movement for peace. Whilst COSATU and the UDF largely share a common political

⁴⁸² Kentridge 1990, 166

⁴⁸³ Aitchison 2003, 68

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid

⁴⁸⁶ Kentridge 1990, 166

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid

position which differs from that of Inkatha, all three organisations share an abhorrence of apartheid and are committed to achieving peace in Natal⁴⁸⁸. Buthelezi's response to this statement was not at all positive. He emphasized that in order for peace processes to work the 'mudslinging' from UDF and COSATU quarters had to come to an end, he stated that 'We are maligned by the very parties who now want us to join in peace initiatives with them'⁴⁸⁹. Buthelezi, together with the Inkatha Central Committee, rejected the peace plan proposed by the UDF/COSATU⁴⁹⁰. Despite this attempts towards peace talks went ahead⁴⁹¹. On the 10th of May of 1989 the ANC in exile stated that they would enter into peace talks with Buthelezi⁴⁹². On this same day Buthelezi agreed to meet with representatives of Cosatu and of the UDF⁴⁹³. Subsequent to this meeting two other meetings between Inkatha, Cosatu and UDF members occurred in Durban on the 19th and 23rd of June of 1989⁴⁹⁴. Attempts toward peace appeared positive and peace rallies were held in various townships in support of this. Thandeka Gqubule had the following to say in the 21 July edition of the *Weekly Mail* about an Inkatha peace rally held in Imbali⁴⁹⁵.

'In contrast with UDF and COSATU rallies, where no single leader stands out, the Inkatha rallies are marked by a 'personality cult'..... This week an Inkatha peace rally in

⁴⁸⁸ Kentridge 1990, 166

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid, 167

⁴⁹¹ Ibid

⁴⁹² Aitchison 2003, 70

⁴⁹³ Ibid

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid

⁴⁹⁵ Kentridge 1990, 168

Imbali..... was characterized by frenzied praise and showers of gifts for the man who is at once Inkatha president, KwaZulu's chief minister and minister of police, and chancellor of the University of Zululand.....Buthelezi's elevation above the political organization of which he is president was evident, as the legislative assembly of KwaZulu and members of the cabinet sat forgotten in the grandstand, while Buthelezi basked alone in the limelight'.

She went on to describe the many gifts received by Buthelezi and spoke of the songs and speeches of praise which were given in his honour⁴⁹⁶. In the speech presented at this rally Buthelezi demanded that Inkatha be included in the Mass Democratic Movement and he called for the release of all political prisoners⁴⁹⁷. Gqubule noted that Buthelezi's utterances were in fact 'drowned out by the applause which he received and in a sense lost in the spectacular nature of the event'⁴⁹⁸.

By August of 1989 there was a hopeful atmosphere in Natal, where according to Monitors at the CAE at the University of Natal, the death toll had decreased since May of 1989⁴⁹⁹. However on the 23rd of September Buthelezi announced a moratorium on further peace talks⁵⁰⁰. He stated that he had found two pamphlets which had been issued by UDF/COSATU supporters and the exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid, 169

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid

(SACTU), which conveyed the message that comrades in the Pietermaritzburg region should exploit the peace negotiations so as to gain leverage over Inkatha⁵⁰¹. The UDF/COSATU and SACTU all denied their involvement with the production of these pamphlets claiming that they were forgeries⁵⁰². Buthelezi did not accept this explanation and peace talks came to a halt⁵⁰³.

In mid November of this same year an Imbizo was held by King Zwelithini in Durban⁵⁰⁴. The King together with Buthelezi spoke of the ANC, UDF and of Cosatu in an antagonistic manner⁵⁰⁵. The King said the following; 'I speak now as King of the Zulus and I say: let no party attack my people⁵⁰⁶. I say to the leadership of the ANC, Cosatu and the UDF: leave my people alone and let them do their Zulu thing⁵⁰⁷.' Chief Buthelezi responded by emphasizing that the King was always to be viewed as being above party politics and then he stated that 'You know that the UDF and Cosatu have come into your midst to turn you against Inkatha'⁵⁰⁸. He noted furthermore that one of the reasons behind the calling of the Imbizo was to put an end to the ANC, UDF and COSATU vilification of him⁵⁰⁹. Buthelezi added, 'The killing-talk, the hurling of insults, the singing of vile songs about the leader of

⁵⁰¹ Ibid

⁵⁰² Ibid

⁵⁰³ Ibid

⁵⁰⁴ Aitchison 2003, 71

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid, 72

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid

the Zulu nation, all make up a recipe for killing'⁵¹⁰. Shortly after this Imbizo took place a number of attacks occurred in the Mpumalanga region for the duration of more than a week by Inkatha supporters levied against members of the UDF and its affiliates⁵¹¹. The month of December saw more deaths as Inkatha followers targeted neighbouring townships in Durban⁵¹². The violence which emerged after the imbizo at which Buthelezi spoke at, may be indicative of the trust and loyalty which his followers awarded to him.

Mudslinging and Train Violence – 1990 (Aitchison)

On the 24th of July of 1990 the first reported incident of train violence occurred in Soweto, the motivation behind this attack appeared to be that of the perpetrators anger towards the UDF for allegedly insulting their chief, Mangosuthu Buthelezi⁵¹³. A large group of Zulu 'warriors' gave testament to their loyalty to Buthelezi when they stormed a train at the Ikwezi station⁵¹⁴. The following day was characterized by the same event occurring⁵¹⁵. On this second day the Zulu attackers had knobkerries, iron bars and pangas in their possession⁵¹⁶. They chanted a traditional Zulu war cry known as 'Usuthu'⁵¹⁷. Many commuters were

⁵¹⁰ Ibid

⁵¹¹ Ibid

⁵¹² Ibid

⁵¹³ Aitchison 2003, 105

⁵¹⁴ Ibid

⁵¹⁵ Ibid

⁵¹⁶ Ibid

⁵¹⁷ Ibid

harmful and a woman was thrown to her death from a moving train⁵¹⁸. When the train slowed down and the commuters began to stone their attackers, they fled from the train and sought refuge in the Jabulani Hostel which was situated nearby⁵¹⁹. In response to the accusations made against Inkatha for the role which they played in the train violence, Themba Khoza, an Inkatha supporter, did not openly admit to Inkatha's involvement he did however have the following to say; 'The only thing we can say, is not to humiliate Chief Buthelezi by singing derogatory songs about him because that creates tension and subsequently leads to conflict'⁵²⁰. A short time prior to this event on the 4th of July of 1990 Buthelezi had once again condemned the 'derogatory epithets' which he believed the ANC used to describe him at the launch which took place to celebrate the renaming of Inkatha, which as of the 04th July of 1990 became the IFP⁵²¹.

When attempting to assess whether or not a political leader qualifies as a charismatic leader, the following questions may be posed. Firstly, does he/she elicit an intense emotional response from individuals and secondly, do individuals experience a sense of the loss of their own personal will when in the proximity of the leader? In response to these two questions and in lieu of the above evidence it does appear to be the case that Buthelezi did indeed elicit a strong emotional response from certain individuals and in addition to this, he also engendered the sense of a loss of personal will on the part of his followers. This conclusion could be criticized however, on the following grounds. It may be suggested that what is

⁵¹⁸ Ibid

⁵¹⁹ Ibid

⁵²⁰ Ibid, 106

⁵²¹ Ibid

revealed in this evidence has more to do with emotions emanating from supporters of an ethnically defined party, and less to do with an individual leader and the emotions which he elicits. The idea expressed in this possible critique is that people were not loyal to Buthelezi. Nor did they trust him or experience a loss of their own sense of personal will in relation to him. This counter argument may suggest that the trust and loyalty of individuals was won by a party that was mobilized around Zulu ethnicity. In line with this, it may be argued that individual personal will became synonymous with the ideology espoused by Inkatha, as it was believed by many that this was a party which sought to advance the interests of all Zulu people⁵²².

This argument when probed is not entirely convincing. In response to it, the following two key points are raised firstly, the duration of Buthelezi's leadership of Inkatha and secondly, the decreasing electoral support gleaned in KwaZulu Natal by the IFP since the year 1994⁵²³. Buthelezi founded the second Inkatha in 1975 and since this time, he has been the only president of the movement, which then became a political party prior to the first democratic elections in 1994⁵²⁴. It is most difficult to separate Buthelezi as an individual from Inkatha/IFP, he founded the movement and has shaped it himself. When thinking of Inkatha or the IFP, it is Buthelezi's face that immediately comes to mind. As such, to claim that the emotions presented in the evidence are levied towards a party and not towards its leader is not entirely convincing, as Buthelezi and Inkatha/IFP appear to be synonymous with one another.

⁵²² De Haas and Zulu 1994, 438

⁵²³ Independent Electoral Commission 1994, 1999, 2004

⁵²⁴ Inkatha Freedom Party n.d (Historical background)

In relation to the second point raised the following may be said. It has been argued in this text that Buthelezi's status as a key national politician has thus far diminished in the democratic South Africa. The claim has been made which suggests that Buthelezi's charismatic attributes have thus far not been able to transcend the political regime change and that this has contributed towards his diminished national status. What is interesting to note is that as his charisma has waned in the democratic context thus far, so too has the electoral support gleaned by the IFP⁵²⁵. 1994 Saw the IFP receiving 1 844 070 votes in KwaZulu Natal⁵²⁶. This figure then became 1 241 522 in 1999 and then decreased to 1 009 267 in the 2004 elections⁵²⁷. If the emotion reflected in the evidence was levied towards the IFP and not Buthelezi, then surely in the democratic context the support for the party would have been more enduring. This has not been the case to date. As Buthelezi's charisma diminished so too has the support for the IFP. As such, this key critique of the manner in which the empirical evidence has been interpreted in this text, does not prove to be entirely convincing. From the evidence presented it does indeed seem plausible to claim that Buthelezi, during the Apartheid era, may have been classified as a leader in possession of charismatic qualities.

Charismatic leadership in the democratic context

During the era of Apartheid, Buthelezi found himself in an extremely powerful position. Politically, he dominated KwaZulu. In 1972, during the time which Buthelezi held the position of Chief Executive Councillor of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, an opposition

⁵²⁵ Independent Electoral Commission 1994, 1999, 2004

⁵²⁶ Independent Electoral Commission 1994

⁵²⁷ Ibid 1999, 2004

party known as the Zulu National Party, led by occasional editor of Africa South, Lloyd Ndaba, formed to challenge his plans for the KwaZulu Homeland⁵²⁸. The party comprised of city dwellers however, it was also awarded the backing of traditionalists⁵²⁹. Those who supported it included Prince Israel, Prince Patrick, Prince Clement, a business mogul from Soweto, E.B. Tshabalala and A.W.G. Champion, who was a Zulu political leader during the time of the existence of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of the 1920's⁵³⁰. The Zulu National Party competed in an Urban Council election in Umlazi against Buthelezi however, they did not enjoy success⁵³¹.

One year later another opposition party known as, Umkhonto ka Shaka (Shaka's Spear), emerged to challenge Buthelezi⁵³². This party was in favour of separate development, which Buthelezi was against (see contextual chapter) and was led by Prince David Zulu, Chief Charles Hlengwa, Abel Mhlongo, Lloyd Ndaba and some former members of the defeated Zulu National Party⁵³³. In 1974 it emerged that this party was receiving funding from the Republic's Bureau of State Security⁵³⁴. In this same year King Goodwill Zwelithini criticized the party and twenty-five of the twenty-six who were members of the Umbumbulu Regional Authority, of which Chief Hlengwa was chairman, resigned and as such he lost his position in

⁵²⁸ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

⁵²⁹ Ibid

⁵³⁰ Ibid

⁵³¹ Ibid

⁵³² Ibid

⁵³³ Ibid

⁵³⁴ Ibid

the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Shaka's spear no longer constituted a challenge to Buthelezi⁵³⁵.

Two other opposition parties formed in the wake of Umkhonto's demise⁵³⁶. The Zulu Labour Party, led by church leader Uvulamehlo Izimtuphuthu, was formed and in addition a party known as, 'the voice of the people', led by Champion A.E. Buthelezi of Dassenhoek and Lawrence and Paulos Nxele, emerged in 1974⁵³⁷. These parties met with little success and in this same year, Buthelezi proposed to the Assembly that opposition parties ought not to exist in KwaZulu, as culturally consensus based decision making was practiced and opposition politics according to Buthelezi, worked in a manner which was contrary to this⁵³⁸. The motion was approved by the Assembly however, it was denied in 1975 by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development⁵³⁹. Zulu politicians did not let this deter them and this led to the formation of Buthelezi's Inkatha, which was to be a home to all Zulu people⁵⁴⁰. The case was such that if individuals wanted to be a part of the region's Legislative Assembly, they would have to be members of Inkatha and in addition, it was decided that the president of Inkatha would also be the Chief Minister of KwaZulu⁵⁴¹.

⁵³⁵ Ibid

⁵³⁶ Ibid

⁵³⁷ Ibid

⁵³⁸ Ibid

⁵³⁹ Ibid

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid

⁵⁴¹ Ibid

When Buthelezi became Chief Minister of KwaZulu he controlled the manner in which pensions were administered, the provision of healthcare, he oversaw the functioning of the police, managed education and even handled the funding for flood relief in the region⁵⁴². In addition, the distribution of land also fell under the auspices of his control⁵⁴³. This intense degree of personalized power which Buthelezi enjoyed during the Apartheid era has dissipated upon the advent of democracy in the country. Whilst working within the Apartheid regime, Buthelezi was given the space to publicly display his charismatic attributes and to attract support. People listened to Buthelezi because he convinced people of the importance of his status as a Zulu chief who also had the approval of King Goodwill Zwelithini, a nephew of his⁵⁴⁴. As discussed earlier, none of the other parties which attempted to challenge Buthelezi in the early 1970's enjoyed this same luxury⁵⁴⁵. Upon the awarding of the position of Chief Minister of KwaZulu to Buthelezi, he effectively dominated the region. With no opposition he was awarded centre-stage and was given the freedom to promote his particular reading of Zulu history⁵⁴⁶. This history spoke of the superiority of the Zulu nation and was to lay the foundation for his successful engagement with the process of ethnic mobilization⁵⁴⁷. It also promoted the idea that as a chief of such a powerful nation, he ought to be treated with respect and rewarded with loyalty⁵⁴⁸.

⁵⁴²Charney 1991, 10

⁵⁴³Szeftel 1994, 192

⁵⁴⁴Adam and Moodley 1992, 500

⁵⁴⁵Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

⁵⁴⁶Waetjen 1999, 653

⁵⁴⁷Ibid

⁵⁴⁸Ibid

Ethnic mobilization, which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, created for Buthelezi an extremely large constituency⁵⁴⁹. As mentioned earlier on in this section, Buthelezi received the loyalty of a large group of Zulu people, who were willing to engage in activities which could potentially be harmful to them, because they trusted him to protect their interests and in fact they believe that his interests and their own, were synonymous⁵⁵⁰. The evidence provided in this chapter, suggests that a sense of the loss of individual will on the part of Buthelezi's constituents occurred and in addition, that he elicited from them an intense level of emotional commitment⁵⁵¹.

The country's transition to democracy had a dire impact upon the level of power enjoyed by Buthelezi. The new democratic dispensation saw the King being paid by central government as opposed to being paid by Buthelezi⁵⁵². When the King became aware of this information in the period just before the first ever democratic elections, he broke rank with Buthelezi and aligned with the ANC⁵⁵³. Buthelezi had in part drawn on the King's allegiance to gain tribal legitimacy; this support which he could publicise had helped to give him status⁵⁵⁴. Without King Zwelithini's support, it may be argued that Buthelezi's legitimacy as a traditional Zulu chief was called into question.

⁵⁴⁹ Southall 1981, 455

⁵⁵⁰ Ashforth 1991, 65

⁵⁵¹ Willner 1984, 8

⁵⁵² Van Kessel and Oomen 1997, 570

⁵⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁵⁴ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

The dominance of the political landscape of KwaZulu which Buthelezi enjoyed in the Apartheid era has been eroded upon in the country's new democratic dispensation⁵⁵⁵. Opposition to the IFP, made manifest through the ANC in particular, is now to be found in KwaZulu and in addition, Buthelezi's access to state resources has diminished⁵⁵⁶. He no longer has the same political space or financing to mobilize people around ethnicity and as such his constituency has waned⁵⁵⁷. Regarding this reference is made to the 2004 provincial election results, the ANC attained 46.98% of the vote whilst the IFP received only 36.82%⁵⁵⁸. Buthelezi's charisma has waned in the democratic context because he no longer has the political space to publicise himself and in this way endear people to his cause.

Chapter Five: Buthelezi and ethnicity

Why did Buthelezi need Inkatha?

This text argues that Buthelezi, through his possession of charisma, was able to make use of the complicated South African social, economic and political landscape, to successfully carry out the process of ethnic mobilization. The task of effective ethnic mobilization was not one which was simple. As Buthelezi began to ascend within the Apartheid state structures in the

⁵⁵⁵ Adam & Moodley 1992, 509

⁵⁵⁶ Van Kessel and Oomen 1997, 570

⁵⁵⁷ Adam & Moodley 1992, 509

⁵⁵⁸ Independent Electoral Commission 2004

early 1970's, he increasingly came under attack for his career 'progression'⁵⁵⁹. The black youth in particular, who were represented by SASO (see contextual chapter), were extremely antagonistic towards him, as were the members of the Natal Trade Union Movement⁵⁶⁰. In the face of such overt criticism, Buthelezi created a political party which would allow for him to possess an organized constituency, which could be mobilized so as to quell this criticism⁵⁶¹. Not only would this political party serve to provide him with real support in terms of addressing the criticisms levied against him from those organizations representing black interests, but the presence of an organized and sizeable support base, would also mark him as a power to be reckoned with, with respect to Pretoria's conception of him. Thus in order to advance in terms of his political career, creating a party was an essential part of ensuring Buthelezi's success. Working as an individual would not ensure this, but with a constituency which could be mobilized so as to influence the decision making processes of other power players, success would be easier to secure.

When the second version of Inkatha was born in 1975, Chief Buthelezi occupied the most central position; indeed he was the reason behind its inception. As mentioned in the contextual chapter, the first Inkatha ka Zulu was founded in 1923 by King Solomon kaDinizulu, for the purpose of protecting Zulu culture⁵⁶². The constitution which Buthelezi made use of for his version of Inkatha was in essence very similar in composition to the first

⁵⁵⁹ Mzala 1988, 116

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid

⁵⁶¹ Ibid

⁵⁶² Golan 1991, 113

movement's constitution⁵⁶³. With respect to this, Buthelezi's party was to be one which was ethnically based from the start⁵⁶⁴.

Buthelezi's ethnic mobilization

For reasons of clarity, the definition of an ethnic group is repeated. *Its members have a cultural affinity with one another, they have a shared history which speaks to the origin of the group and in addition, they regard themselves as unique to other groups*⁵⁶⁵. The question which will be addressed in this second part of the chapter comprises of two parts: Firstly, how did Buthelezi set about forging the parameters of the Zulu ethnic group and secondly, how did he manage to make ethnicity the most salient part of the social identities of the many individuals who were residing in KwaZulu? I commence with a discussion which speaks to the first part of the question.

A shared history

Buthelezi needed to present a reading of Zulu history which would paint him in a favourable light and which would assist in legitimizing some of the actions undertaken by him, which were being criticised by black people in particular⁵⁶⁶. A few brief examples of that which

⁵⁶³ Ibid

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid

⁵⁶⁵ Marè 1993, 11

⁵⁶⁶ Mzala 1988, 116

formed a part of Buthelezi's reading of Zulu history will be presented. In various speeches Buthelezi spoke of the Zulu people as a group which had always been homogenous and which had fought and won against the colonial powers, who sought to drive them out of the specific region that they had traditionally occupied⁵⁶⁷. He claimed that this area constituted the homeland of KwaZulu and that it in fact had always been home to the Zulu people, even prior to the commencement of Apartheid⁵⁶⁸. At this point it is important to recall specific assertions made in the earlier contextual chapter. Alternate readings of Zulu history point to the belief that Zululand was populated by a multitude of different groupings such as the Xhosa and Tsonga⁵⁶⁹. In addition to this, competing historical accounts argue that the Zulu people have historically been deeply divided along different lines such as that of spirituality for example (see contextual chapter).⁵⁷⁰

Buthelezi's choice to utilize the reading of history which claims that Zulu people were traditionally a homogenous group and that they as this unified grouping occupied KwaZulu was made so as to legitimize his involvement with the Apartheid state. His acceptance of the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu was sanctioned by the particular reading of Zulu history which he chose to espouse⁵⁷¹. In addition to this, Shaka, Cetshwayo and Dingane amongst other legendary warriors and members of the royal house, as has previously been

⁵⁶⁷ Szeftel 1994, 194

⁵⁶⁸ Marè 1992, 64

⁵⁶⁹ Gump 1990, 34

⁵⁷⁰ De Villiers Minnaar 1991, 5

⁵⁷¹ Marè 1992, 64

alluded to, featured prominently in Buthelezi's reading of Zulu history⁵⁷². The following quote taken from a speech he gave to a group of people in Umbongintwini in 1976 illustrates this assertion. 'I am a great-grandson of King Cetshwayo, a grandson of King Dinizulu and the son of Princess Magogo, the full sister of King Solomon ka Dinizulu, and am a member of the Zulu Royal House in my own right.....I acted as Prime Minister to King Cyprian, who was my first cousin, for 16 years, before there was any separate development of politics in KwaZulu'⁵⁷³. This focus on royal blood in particular was not without purpose.

In the previous chapter it has been mentioned that during his recounting of this glorious past at various public events, the presence of King Goodwill Zwelithini KaBekhezulu at his side was not in the least uncommon⁵⁷⁴. The value of historical royalty was highlighted by Buthelezi in speech and this was reinforced still further by him almost always having the Zulu King at his side. The attention given to royalty in Buthelezi's version of the past, afforded him the opportunity to validate that institution in more contemporary times. This was beneficial to Buthelezi for the following two reasons. Firstly as mentioned in the previous chapter, with the King at his side Buthelezi gained historical legitimacy. He had foregrounded the virtues of Shaka who was of royal blood and in so doing he demanded respect for the royal institution of which King Zwelithini was a part. With the latter at his side and sanctioning his activities, Buthelezi created a situation in which not only did King Zwelithini support him, but those of old such as Shaka did too. A second benefit awarded to Buthelezi through the recounting of his specific reading of history was the following; making

⁵⁷² Campbell, Marè and Walker 1995, 293

⁵⁷³ Buthelezi 1979, 61

⁵⁷⁴ Waetjen 1999, 660

salient the issue of royalty afforded Buthelezi the opportunity to have people view themselves as subjects to authority, as opposed to viewing themselves as individuals who were capable of making their own decisions⁵⁷⁵. A group of subjects rather than of critical individuals would make for a much more malleable constituency.

We are unique

Numerous instances have been recorded in which Buthelezi differentiates between the Zulu 'nation' and the 'others'⁵⁷⁶. In addition to this, the Zulu ethnic group is always described as more superior to those who form part of other ethnic affiliations⁵⁷⁷. In order to solidify the distinction between the Zulu nation and other ethnic groups, Buthelezi would often refer for example to the military might of Zulu men and he described them as 'brothers born of warrior stock'⁵⁷⁸. Zulu women in turn were given status as they were viewed as being 'the bearers of warriors'⁵⁷⁹.

⁵⁷⁵ Marè 1992, 64

⁵⁷⁶ Szeftel 1994, 194

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid

Moulding cultural affinity

As referred to in the Conceptual Chapter, certain symbols become the means by which individuals identify with the group to which they belong⁵⁸⁰. With respect to this, the military might of the Zulu nation, as well as being one of the reasons as to why the Zulus were perceived to be different to other groups of people, was used by Buthelezi as a symbolic value which would assist in binding the Zulu people together⁵⁸¹. However, more interesting is the fact that Buthelezi developed a situation in which he in and of himself, became the symbolic representation of the Zulu nation⁵⁸². Buthelezi, through the process of convincingly utilizing a specific reading of history, was able to gain historical legitimacy and as such, he afforded himself the opportunity to become the personal embodiment of all that was Zulu. With reference to this, Buthelezi revealed what exactly being Zulu entailed to his subjects. He ensured that he became the living symbol of Zulu culture.

Recruiting a constituency

How did Buthelezi set about rendering ethnicity the most salient part of the social identities of those residing in KwaZulu? The previous section illustrates the manner in which Buthelezi created the definite parameters of a Zulu ethnic group. Not only did he set these parameters, but as mentioned, he became the personal embodiment of all that was Zulu. The path had been cleared for the process of recruiting members to Inkatha. He had developed a

⁵⁸⁰ Maré 1993, 12

⁵⁸¹ Ibid

⁵⁸² Maré 1993, 53

situation in which he had historically, legitimate authority and as such, he was able to turn many of those who identified themselves as being part of the Zulu ethnic group into members of his political party, Inkatha. Buthelezi dictated what it meant to be Zulu and in line with this, being Zulu meant being a member of Inkatha. Buthelezi spoke of the Zulu nation and of Inkatha in a synonymous fashion; an example cited earlier on in the text is recounted here to illustrate this assertion. At a Shaka Day rally which was held in Clermont, Durban in 1986⁵⁸³. Posters read as follows: ‘All proud Zulus’..... ‘Mighty Nation’ ‘SHOW THAT WE ARE PROUD OF OUR LEADERS AND THAT WE BACK THEM’⁵⁸⁴. The posters also clearly illustrated that it was Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, president of the Inkatha movement, who was the man of the day and the person who, together with his party, was going to work to improve the living conditions of all Zulu people⁵⁸⁵.

Not only did Buthelezi define that which was Zulu in order to mobilize a constituency, he also instilled in people a fear of those who were part of other ethnic groupings, in this way making ethnicity the most salient feature in the social identities of those living in KwaZulu. Painting an image of those who were not Zulu (particularly ANC members) as being anti-Zulu, assisted Buthelezi with the task of developing a loyal constituency.

Whilst it is clearly the case that ethnic mobilization presented itself as a viable strategy to employ in the quest to garner support for Inkatha in the pre-democratic period of South

⁵⁸³ De Haas and Zulu 1994, 438

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid

Africa's history. In the country's post democratic transition period, the IFP as it is now known has been hard-pressed to distance itself from its ethnic history. This begs the question, why is the strategy of ethnic mobilization no longer overtly employed by the IFP?

Ethnic mobilization and democracy: Then and now

The final adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996 greatly impinged upon Buthelezi's capacity to successfully mobilize a constituency around ethnicity. No special status is given to any group identity in the constitution be it a religious, language or ethnic based affiliation⁵⁸⁶. In the country's current political landscape an individual's right to practice religion, to speak their mother tongue and to have their ethnic identity protected are concretized in a bill of rights⁵⁸⁷. However, it is important to note that it is the individual's right to certain freedoms and that of protection, which is found in the constitution and no special group dispensations are advocated⁵⁸⁸.

Where previously Buthelezi was rewarded by the Apartheid state both financially and with respect to his career development for the politicization of ethnicity, this is clearly no longer the case⁵⁸⁹. With respect to this, Buthelezi's focus on ethnic exclusivity was directly in line with the Apartheid government's policy of separate development. This was a policy based upon an idea espoused by Verwoerd, which suggested that both happiness and stability could

⁵⁸⁶ Maré 1992, 107

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid

⁵⁸⁹ Adam and Moodley 1992, 488

only be found if each respective group of people possessed a Homeland, government and language which was unique to them⁵⁹⁰. In contrast to this, the current task of South Africa's first democratic government is that of nation building, which entails the removal of divisions which exist in society, be they ethnic, religious or racially based to name but a few⁵⁹¹. One could in response to this argue that the ANC government has implemented policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Affirmative Action which some believe promote group favouritism. However, in response to this possible criticism it should be noted that in the context of this text such policies are believed to have been implemented so as to promote economic equality, this in turn creating a foundation upon which a truly unified nation can emerge. Whether these policies have been successful is not the topic of this thesis. Suffice to say that whether viewed as promoting group favouritism or not, institutionalized separate development on the economic, social and political levels is no longer a policy which is promoted by the new democratic government and as a result, Buthelezi is no longer rewarded for the promoting of such ideals.

In addition to this, the advent of democracy in South Africa has brought with it a diversification in the interests of society, particularly with respect to the increasing salience of class and gender identities⁵⁹². During the country's Apartheid period the government created a system in which an individual's daily activities were dictated by the colour of their skin and their ethnic grouping. Those who were white benefited materially from this simple biological characteristic, as well as with respect to the opportunities and freedoms afforded to

⁵⁹⁰ Verkuyl n.d

⁵⁹¹ ANC 52nd National Conference 2007, 1

⁵⁹² Marè 1992, 111

them. In contrast to this, being categorized as a person of colour meant being denied equal access to these same material resources, freedoms and opportunities. It was in this context of economic, social and political repression that race and ethnicity were made salient and the process of ethnic mobilization which was implemented by a charismatic leader, was able to take root in the country. With respect to this, Buthelezi, a charismatic individual, was able to create a seemingly unified Zulu 'nation', which he instilled with a fear relating to the supposed quest of primarily ANC members, to set about disempowering the Zulu nation and taking from them what little they had⁵⁹³.

To summarize, the result of the adoption of the country's very progressive constitution with its bill of rights precluding the development of political parties that are discriminatory in nature, has been a curtailment of the political space afforded to Buthelezi. In addition, the government of South Africa with its focus on nation building does not remunerate or support in any other way, a party which seeks to divide the nation along ethnic lines. Finally, the emergence of diversified interests within the country have had a profound effect on the salience of both race and ethnicity and as such, individual social identities are increasingly less defined by racial or ethnic salience. At this point the discussion at the end of the previous chapter around Buthelezi's waning charisma in the democratic context is recalled. His waning charisma together with the changes described above and those to be discussed in the chapter to follow, are believed to be behind his decline in power in the country's democratic context to date.

⁵⁹³ Adam and Moodley 1992, 488

Ethnicity and charisma

Buthelezi had shown his charismatic personality in a public manner and people listened to him as he highlighted the importance of chieftainship and of royalty in a convincing manner. From his revered position he promulgated a reading of history which provided him with further legitimacy in that it sanctioned his involvement with the Apartheid state. Buthelezi became the symbol of 'Zuluness' and he revealed to all what exactly being Zulu meant. From this charismatic vantage point, Buthelezi was able to successfully carry out the process of ethnic mobilization. Mention has been made of the fact that certain structural factors such as the political, social and economic difficulties which were being experienced by black people in general, and in this instance by those living in KwaZulu in particular, may have made them more susceptible to ethnic mobilization. However, as mentioned in the literature review undertaken earlier, structural factors alone cannot explain the success which Buthelezi enjoyed in the mobilization of a Zulu constituency. If certain structural factors such as those referred to, which are always in existence in society, were the only pre-requisite to successful ethnic mobilization, then surely we would see many more instances of it occurring.

Chapter Six: Patronage

Buthelezi's career progression and the nature of the homeland of KwaZulu

At the time of Inkatha's second birth in the year of 1975, Buthelezi was firmly anchored within the Apartheid state structures⁵⁹⁴. 1970 saw him accepting the position of Chief

⁵⁹⁴ Maré and Hamilton 1987, 46

Executive Officer (CEO) of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA)⁵⁹⁵. The executive of the ZTA comprised of chiefs and their various traditional councillors, who were representative of a multitude of Zulu 'tribes' in Natal⁵⁹⁶. It was an organization designed by the NP government to promote the implementation of the Bantu-Self Government Act of 1959, which sought to have the Zulu population residing in the future self-governing homeland of KwaZulu⁵⁹⁷. In 1972 the ZTA morphed into the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA)⁵⁹⁸. The creation of this assembly gave the developing Homeland of KwaZulu limited legislative as well as executive powers⁵⁹⁹.

As CEO of the KLA, Buthelezi, together with the other executive councillors, insisted that the position of the Zulu king become ceremonial in nature and that this was to be formulated in the new constitution, which was drafted by the government for KwaZulu⁶⁰⁰. The central government granted Buthelezi a further concession when they agreed to permit him to select his own executive councillors⁶⁰¹. These two constitutional stipulations promoted a situation in which Buthelezi could secure for himself a large degree of personal control over KwaZulu⁶⁰². The King could not politically challenge him and he was able to place those

⁵⁹⁵ Inkatha Freedom Party 1999 (Biographies)

⁵⁹⁶ Marè and Hamilton 1987, 38

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid, 36

⁵⁹⁸ Inkatha Freedom Party 1999 (Biographies)

⁵⁹⁹ Marè and Hamilton 1987, 41

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid

⁶⁰¹ Ibid, 43

⁶⁰² Marè and Hamilton 1987, 42

who were loyal to him in the executive council of the KLA⁶⁰³. Buthelezi's ascent in the Apartheid created power structures did not end here. A year after the inception of the second Inkatha, Buthelezi became Chief Minister of KwaZulu, a position he held until 1994⁶⁰⁴. The two constitutional concessions awarded to Buthelezi and his acquiring of the position of Chief Minister of KwaZulu, permitted him to become the chief broker of patronage in the region⁶⁰⁵.

During this period KwaZulu was a region characterized by both low income per capita and low levels of labour productivity⁶⁰⁶. Rapid population growth in the region resulted in land as well as food shortages⁶⁰⁷. Another effect of the overpopulation of the area was that of unemployment⁶⁰⁸. KwaZulu was also characterized by an abundance of children below the age of fifteen, who occupied dependent roles and who as such, were economically unproductive⁶⁰⁹. Agriculture constituted the key economic activity however; it was practiced primarily in a non-commercial capacity⁶¹⁰. The backward status of agricultural technology in the region, did not allow for the conversion to commercial agriculture⁶¹¹. An infrastructure

⁶⁰³ Ibid

⁶⁰⁴ Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, MP: President of the Inkatha Freedom Party 1999

⁶⁰⁵ Charney 1991, 10

⁶⁰⁶ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 122

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid

⁶¹⁰ Ibid

⁶¹¹ Ibid

for industrial development was also absent from the region⁶¹². Regarding this, KwaZulu was characterized by the majority of people not having access to electricity, piped water existed in an extremely limited capacity and healthcare facilities were rudimentary⁶¹³. In addition to this, the majority of people did not have access to reliable transport⁶¹⁴. Owing to the region's lack of private enterprise and its failure to engage in commercial agriculture, its inhabitants were extremely reliant on both the Homeland and Republican governments for their survival⁶¹⁵. The following table illustrates the economic underperformance of KwaZulu and its dependence upon the Republic for funding.

	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
From the Republic:	22,110,000	33,776,000	51,846,000	69,710,000
Republic Percentage:	68,5%	74%	78,5%	80,5%
Homeland Sources:	10,199,200	11,679,000	14,252,300	16,883,000
Homeland Percentage:	31,5%	26%	21,5%	19,5%

(Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1979, 146: Table 6.4.)

The increasing levels of funding which were provided to KwaZulu were not challenged by the white population or by white politicians⁶¹⁶. Government had stated that these amounts

⁶¹² Ibid

⁶¹³ Ibid

⁶¹⁴ Ibid

⁶¹⁵ Ibid

⁶¹⁶ Ibid, 145

which were spent on the homelands were necessary to ensure internal security and it appeared that they had successfully sold this idea⁶¹⁷. One of the goals of the Apartheid government was to get each homeland to accept independence, which would result in their inhabitants having no political or residential rights in South Africa⁶¹⁸. In accordance with this, the government set about providing the homeland leaders with more control over their territories⁶¹⁹. As was mentioned in the literature review, Buthelezi would not accept complete independence for KwaZulu however; the government did not stop their attempts to convince him to change his mind in this regard⁶²⁰. Power was increasingly handed over to Buthelezi in a bid to ultimately allow for him to govern the independent homeland of KwaZulu.

Buthelezi's position as Chief Minister of KwaZulu afforded him the opportunity to dispense of resources to those in support of his movement and to further publicise his image as a legitimate chief and representative of the Zulu people. His officials were able to provide their clients with employment opportunities, with licenses for shops and bottle stores, with housing and food amongst other things⁶²¹. In addition, reference is made to an example cited in the literature review, which spoke of the manner in which land and rental properties were dealt

⁶¹⁷ Ibid

⁶¹⁸ Schlemmer and Muil 1975, 108

⁶¹⁹ Ibid

⁶²⁰ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 93 & 97

⁶²¹ De Haas and Zulu 1994, 440

with by Buthelezi and his supporters. Mention was made of the fact that Pondo people were excluded from buying or renting plots, which were reserved for Zulu people⁶²².

The school curriculum in KwaZulu was also reformatted and the revised text books echoed the reading of history which Buthelezi espoused⁶²³. The books unquestionably described Buthelezi as a legitimate Zulu chief and spoke of Inkatha as being the movement which represented Zulu tradition and custom⁶²⁴. Buthelezi also made use of his resources to ensure that his status as chief and representative of the Zulu people as a whole, was publicised in newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts⁶²⁵.

How did Buthelezi win the legitimacy required to become KwaZulu's chief broker of patronage?

Buthelezi publicised in a manner which resonated with many individuals, a reading of Zulu history which placed emphasis on certain traditions which benefited him directly⁶²⁶. Whilst it appears that many politicians engage in such practices, Buthelezi's situation was different to many in that he was able to share his reading of Zulu history in a very public manner. Regarding this, mention was made of the fact that inside of KwaZulu, Buthelezi was not

⁶²² Szeftel 1994, 192

⁶²³ Golan 1991, 120

⁶²⁴ Ibid

⁶²⁵ Waetjen 1999, 660

⁶²⁶ Mzala 1988, 116

challenged by an effective opposition⁶²⁷. In addition to this, as a result of his working within the confines of the Apartheid structures and in line with the government's policy of separate development, he was neither challenged by the Apartheid authorities⁶²⁸. As such, Buthelezi was awarded a political platform upon which he was able to foreground the importance of chiefs and of the Zulu royal family to Zulu culture and tradition⁶²⁹. The constant referrals to the importance of chiefs and that of Zulu royalty made salient his status as a chief and his linkage to Zulu royalty. The reading of history publicised by Buthelezi facilitated his being viewed as a legitimate, traditional leader.

Historically, Zulu chiefs have been the 'guarantors of tribal harmony'⁶³⁰. They engaged in conflict resolution, land distribution and were tasked with the management of social and cultural cohesion⁶³¹. During the colonial era, (discussed in more detail in the contextual chapter) Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary of Native Affairs, implemented a system of indirect rule in colonial Natal, this became known as the 'Shepstone system'⁶³². The authority of chiefs was recognized in this system and they in fact retained control over land distribution⁶³³. In 1927 the situation changed when the Black Administration Act (No. 38) was introduced, this substantially diminished the authority of the chiefs⁶³⁴. Upon the NP's

⁶²⁷ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

⁶²⁸ Ibid, 78

⁶²⁹ Golan 1991, 114

⁶³⁰ Beall 2005, 760

⁶³¹ Ibid

⁶³² Ibid

⁶³³ Ibid

⁶³⁴ Ibid

electoral victory in 1948, the status of chiefs once again went under review⁶³⁵. They chose to reinstate the chiefs with a greater degree of power, as this worked in accordance with their ideology of separate development, which became legal policy a few years after their accession to power⁶³⁶.

It was the case that some chiefs who reported to the NP government such as Lucas Mangope for example, homeland leader of Bophuthatswana, were viewed as Apartheid lackeys because they were believed to be courting the approval of government at the expense of their own people. Mangope's ready acceptance of independence and his choice to use Afrikaans institutions as models for Tswana brought him into disrepute⁶³⁷. Buthelezi on the other hand, retained for himself an ambiguous image with respect to the liberation struggle⁶³⁸. His refusal of independence and his strong international and domestic presence with respect to anti-Apartheid campaigning, whilst working within Apartheid structures awarded him such an image⁶³⁹. Whilst as has been mentioned there were some who viewed him as an Apartheid puppet and as a illegitimate South African chief, there were many who believed that he was a traditional chief who sought to protect his people and as such, he was awarded the support of thousands⁶⁴⁰. This belief by many in Buthelezi's traditional legitimacy afforded him legitimate access to material resources.

⁶³⁵ Ibid

⁶³⁶ Ibid

⁶³⁷ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 76 & 77

⁶³⁸ Beall 2005, 761 & 762

⁶³⁹ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 93

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid, 81

One could argue at this point, that the existence of traditional legitimacy was meaningless as it relates to access to material resources, as particularly at the onset of Buthelezi occupying the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu, he was made to have access to such resources via the Apartheid government. The central South African government did not come out against the development of a clientelistic system in KwaZulu, indeed the system of patronage worked to promote the success of their policy of separate development. Patronage promotes both reliance and compliance which in turn, does not bode well for self-development. It would seem that the existence of a constituency which was caught up in a cycle of poverty, illiteracy, compliance and reliance would not pose a direct threat towards the success of separate development.

In response to the argument which suggests that traditional legitimacy was in fact unnecessary as Buthelezi already had access to resources via the Apartheid government, the following is noted. In order for Pretoria to recognize Buthelezi as being indispensable, he needed to be viewed as legitimate by many Zulu people, in this way commanding the support of a large group, who offered him their loyalty. The capacity which Buthelezi possessed to manage and in this way control and prevent such a large grouping of people from openly challenging the policy of separate development, was what made Buthelezi indispensable to Pretoria. This belief by government of the value of Buthelezi was in turn integral to the furthering of his own political agenda and his capacity to negotiate his demands with Pretoria. Possessing the title of chief provided him with a sorely needed political tool, which

he made use of both in his dealings with what became his constituency and with the Apartheid authorities⁶⁴¹.

Democracy and Patrimonialism

South Africa's democratization process has marked the end of Buthelezi's grand-scale utilization of patronage. Democratic regimes are characterized in part by the existence of a free press, by their oversight mechanisms and in addition by the transparent manner in which public officials are expected to perform their functions.⁶⁴² During the Apartheid era, Buthelezi, as has been mentioned, dominated the press⁶⁴³. The newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts in KwaZulu spoke of Inkatha in a favourable light and for the most part did not serve to act as a critical press, which demanded accountability from its leader⁶⁴⁴. Without this oversight mechanism being prevalent in the region, Buthelezi's engagement with the practice of patronage politics which excluded certain groups, was not openly challenged in a public forum⁶⁴⁵. In the country's democratic context this is no longer the case, the press of today is extremely critical of the manner in which public officials conduct themselves. In support of this free press claim, the research undertaken by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the results of which were published in 2005, has been consulted. IDASA utilized research from the Afrobarometer, a website which provides various political,

⁶⁴¹ Golan 1991, 114

⁶⁴² Mzizi 2004, 196

⁶⁴³ Waetjen 1999, 660

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid

public opinion surveys and analyses thereof, which have been undertaken in Africa and which relate to democracy in particular. The following question was posed with respect to South Africa's democratic status, 'How effective is the protection of expression, **information** and assembly for all persons irrespective of their social grouping⁶⁴⁶?' The score achieved in relation to this question was 8, with 10 constituting the ideal. The press is free to disseminate information, whether critical or not and given the number of people reached by the various media forms, public officials are forced to account for their actions.

Parliament, which is a reflection of the electoral outcome in a democracy, also acts as a further mechanism to hold the executive to account⁶⁴⁷. This impacts upon the capacity of individuals in the executive to engage in types of behaviour which they are not able to rationally explain to the legislature and which might bring them into disrepute⁶⁴⁸. During the Apartheid period Buthelezi was not being held accountable by the KwaZulu Legislature in fact, all members of the KLA were Inkatha supporters and were extremely loyal to Buthelezi and in addition, those occupying positions in the executive of the KLA had been directly appointed by him⁶⁴⁹.

With regards to judicial oversight, it was the case that Buthelezi operated within the Apartheid state's rule of law and the position afforded to him by Pretoria of Prime Minister of

⁶⁴⁶ Calland and Graham 2005, 33

⁶⁴⁷ Calland and Graham 2005, 29

⁶⁴⁸ Matlosa 2004, 23

⁶⁴⁹ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

KwaZulu, legally entitled him to establish personal control over the region and awarded him the right to dispense of resources as he saw fit⁶⁵⁰. In the country's democratic dispensation with its focus on institutions as opposed to personal rule, this practice of patronage politics is not openly accepted⁶⁵¹. It no way is it being suggested that patronage politics does not occur in democratic regimes however, it is being argued that patronage politics is not openly sanctioned in democratic states and as such, those found guilty of it may be subject to legal repercussions.

With the end of Apartheid the homeland system was abolished and Buthelezi no longer possesses the access to resources on the scale that he once did. No longer is Buthelezi being paid by government to keep the citizens of KwaZulu in a state of underdevelopment, so as to prohibit the emergence of a threat to their reign. Important to note here, is the fact that democracy provides people with a formalized process of access to resources and to equal treatment before the law⁶⁵². In addition, in a democratic dispensation formal institutions exist through which individuals are able to ensure that their political and economic rights are not being infringed upon. As such, with a focus on institutions the political space for the control of resources by autocratic and personalistic leaders is no longer as prolific⁶⁵³.

⁶⁵⁰ Charney 1991, 10

⁶⁵¹ Wiarda 2002, 5

⁶⁵² Adam and Moodley 1992, 509

⁶⁵³ Wiarda 2002, 5

Does Buthelezi's practicing of patronage suggest that he in fact did not have the attributes of a charismatic leader during the Apartheid era?

This chapter has provided a detailed account of the manner in which Buthelezi set about dispensing patronage to those Zulu people who supported him. Given that much evidence exists to support the claim that he practiced patronage politics, does this not mean that the possibility of categorizing him as a charismatic leader is nullified? Is it not the case that Buthelezi was not in fact a charismatic leader and rather an individual who attained support, through the dispensing of goods and services? Charismatic leaders after all possess some kind of unique quality which permits them to be viewed as figures of authority. Their status as authority figures has to do with their possession of a unique quality as opposed to their capacity to dispense of goods or services, so as to attain loyalty from people. Put differently, the practice of patronage cannot create charismatic leaders.

Whilst being fully aware and in agreement with the information which has just been mentioned, it appears that it is still plausible to categorize Buthelezi as a charismatic figure. In the absence of his access to patronage Buthelezi still attained a large degree of support. As was mentioned, Buthelezi became Prime Minister in 1976, a position which afforded him the opportunity to dispense of patronage on a grand-scale. However, prior to this time he already had a following of loyal supporters which suggests that he did not gain a following simply through the practice of patronage politics. At this point the discussion which was held in the chapter on charisma and which related to the formation of opposition parties in KwaZulu from 1972 to 1974, at the time at which Buthelezi was CEO of the KLA is recalled.

During this two year period as was mentioned, four opposition parties emerged so as to challenge Buthelezi's plans for the KwaZulu homeland⁶⁵⁴. All four parties enjoyed no success⁶⁵⁵. After the demise of the final opposition party, 'The Voice of the People', which was founded in 1974, Buthelezi put the following to the KLA⁶⁵⁶. He suggested that all opposition parties ought to be banned in KwaZulu as opposition in the form of parties went against Zulu culture and practice⁶⁵⁷. The Assembly supported Buthelezi's request however, it could not be actioned because the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development refused to accept this motion in 1975⁶⁵⁸. This event was one of the factors which led to the formation of the second Inkatha, which emerged in 1975 and which was partially populated by those who had supported Buthelezi's request to ban opposition parties in the region⁶⁵⁹.

The view espoused in this text is that Buthelezi gained the power to dispense of patronage through his charismatic attributes. He convinced both Pretoria and a large following of Zulu people of his indispensability and this was the reason behind his access to patronage. In no way is the claim being made that Buthelezi achieved a charismatic status through his access to patronage but rather, what is being argued is that his access to patronage rested on his charismatic personality, as it was this which rendered him indispensable.

⁶⁵⁴ Butler, Rotberg and Adams 1977, 57

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid

His charisma was partly responsible for his successful implementation of the process of ethnic mobilization which afforded him a large constituency. It was this large following which he possessed prior to his attaining of the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu, which afforded him access to patronage on such a grand-scale. Pretoria realized his power and in an attempt to woo him, awarded him the position of Prime Minister of KwaZulu. Buthelezi's charisma existed independently of his access to patronage and even though he dispensed of patronage, this is not reason enough to suggest that he cannot be classified as a charismatic leader.

Conclusion

During South Africa's Apartheid era, Buthelezi through his charismatic attributes elicited strong emotional commitment from people through effectively appealing to a certain reading of Zulu history, a history which foregrounded the importance of chieftaincy and that of the Zulu Royal Family. With his title of chief and his convincing demeanour he had leverage with regards to his capacity to bargain for political power with Pretoria. The presence of the King, who is the most important figure in Zulu custom, at his side during public events served to further cement his legitimacy as traditional Zulu chief.

The latter message was also being echoed in school syllabuses as well as over the radio and in magazines. Using his charisma, Buthelezi was able to mobilize along ethnic lines. He created a homogenous Zulu 'nation' for some by making dominant his reading of Zulu history. Symbols were used to create a sense of cultural affinity between people and in

addition, he stressed the belief that the Zulu people were superior to other ethnic groups and as such they were unique. With the parameters set for his new constituency and his traditional legitimacy gained, Buthelezi set about recruiting members to Inkatha.

He created the situation in which Inkatha was made to be synonymous with Zulu culture. Loyalty to the movement translated into obedience to Zulu custom. As has been illustrated, democracy thus far appears to have led to a waning of Buthelezi's power, as is evidenced by the dwindling number of votes received by the IFP. His charisma has weakened in the face of a political system which is characterized by legal-rationalism and the routinization of bureaucracy. Buthelezi is no longer rewarded by the state for his engagement with the process of ethnic mobilization. We do not see the Buthelezi of old, adorned in his famous leopard skins with assegai in hand, shouting the cries of Zulu Nationalism. Instead, he now appears as a subdued member of parliament, adorned in suits of a respectable hue.

Bibliography

- Adam, H., and K. Moodley. 1992. Political violence, 'tribalism', and Inkatha. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (3): 485-510.
- Adam, H., and H. Gilliomee. 1979. *Ethnic power mobilized*. London: Yale University Press.
- Aitchison, J. 2003. *The role of political violence in South Africa's democratization*, Ed. R. Greenstein, 47-94. Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry.
- ANC 52nd National Conference. August, 2007. *Building a national democratic society: Strategy and tactics of the ANC*. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/2007/conference/tactics.html> (accessed March 25, 2008)
- Ashforth, A. 1991. War party: Buthelezi and Apartheid. *Transition* 52: 56-69.
- Beall, J., S. Mkhize, and S. Vawda. 2005. Emergent democracy and 'resurgent tradition': Institutions, chieftaincy and transition in KwaZulu-Natal. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31(4): 755-771.
- Bendix, R., and G. Roth. 1971. *Scholarship and partisanship: Essays on Max Weber*. Berkeley: University of California press.
- Bendix, R. 1959. *Max Weber: An intellectual portrait*. London: Methuen and Co.
- Berman, B. 1998. Ethnicity, patronage and the African State: The politics of uncivil nationalism. *African Affairs* 97 (388): 305-341.

- Bratton, M., and N. Van de Walle. 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and political transitions in Africa. *World Politics* 46 (4): 453-489.
- Brewer, J. 1985. *Official ideology and lay members' beliefs in Inkatha*. *Politikon* 12 (1): 57-62.
- Buthelezi, M.G. 1979. *Power is ours*. New York: Books in Focus Inc.
- Buthelezi, M.G. 1974. *White and black nationalism, ethnicity and the future of the Homelands*. Natal: South African Institute of Race Relations.
- Butler, J., R. Rotberg, and J. Adams. 1977. *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The political and economic development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Calland, R., and P. Graham, Eds. 2005. *IDASA's democracy index: Democracy in the time of Mbeki*. Cape Town: IDASA.
- Campbell, C., G. Marè, and C. Walker. 1995. Evidence for an ethnic identity in the life histories of Zulu-speaking Durban township residents. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21 (2): 287-301.
- Carton, B. 2000. *Blood from your children*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.
- Charney, C. 1991. Vigilantes, clientelism, and the South African State. *Transformation* 16: 1-28.
- Cherry, J. 1994. Development, conflict and the politics of ethnicity in South Africa's transition to democracy. *Third World Quarterly* 15 (4): 613-631.

- Cohen, A. 1979. Political symbolism. *Annual review of Anthropology* 8: 87-113.
- De Haas, M., and P. Zulu. 1994. Ethnicity and federalism: The case of KwaZulu/Natal. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20 (3): 433-446.
- De Villiers Minnaar, A. 1991. *Conflict and violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical perspectives*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council
- Elder, G. 2003. Malevolent traditions: Hostel violence and the procreational geography of Apartheid. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29 (4): 921-935.
- Golan, D. 1994. *Inventing Shaka: Using history in the construction of Zulu nationalism*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Golan, D. 1991. Inkatha and its use of the Zulu past. *History in Africa* 18: 113-126.
- Government Communication and Information System (GCIS). 2002. *Profile Information: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Dr.* http://www.gcis.gov.za/gcis/gcis_profile.jsp?id=3652 (accessed March 21, 2008).
- Gump, J. 1990. *The formation of the Zulu Kingdom in South Africa: 1750-1840*. California: Mellen Research University Press.
- Halisi, C. 1997. From liberation to citizenship: Identity and innovation in Black South African political thought. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 39 (1): 61-85.

Harries, P. 1993. Imagery, symbolism and tradition in a South African Bantustan: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha, and Zulu history. *History and theory* 32 (4): 105-125.

Herbst, J. 1994. Creating a new South Africa. *Foreign Policy* 94: 120-135.

Heydebrand, W., Ed. 1999. *Max Weber: Sociological writings*. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company.

Horowitz, D. 1991. *A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a Divided Society*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Independent Electoral Commission. 2004. *National and provincial elections 2004*.

http://www.elections.org.za/Elections2004_Static.asp?radResult=50&selProvinces=4 (accessed March 22, 2008).

Independent Electoral Commission. 1999. <http://www.elections.org.za/results/province4.asp> (accessed March 22, 2008)

Independent Electoral Commission. 1994. <http://www.elections.org.za/elections94.asp> (accessed March 22, 2008)

Inkatha Freedom Party. 1999. *Biographies: Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, MP – President of the Inkatha Freedom Party*. <http://www.ifp.org.za> (accessed March 21, 2008).

Inkatha Freedom Party. N.d. *Historical background*. <http://www.ifp.org.za> (accessed March 21, 2008).

Inkatha Freedom Party. 1998. *Archive: Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. <http://www.ifp.org.za/Archive/trc/trc517.htm> (accessed March 21, 2008).

Institute for social and economic research. 1981. *Succession conflict within the church of the Nazarites*. Durban: University of Durban-Westville.

Jeffery, A. 1997. *The Natal story: 16 Years of conflict*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Johnson, R., and L Schlemmer Ed. 1996. *Launching democracy in South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Joseph, R. 1997. Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and theoretical perspectives. *Comparative Politics* 29 (3): 363-382.

Kentridge, M. 1990. *An unofficial war: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg*. Claremont: David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd.

Lindholm, C. 1990. *Charisma*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Lodge, T. 1995. The South African general election, April 1994: Results, analysis and implications. *African Affairs* 94 (377): 471-500.

Marè, G. 1993. *Ethnicity and politics in South Africa*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Marè, G. 1992. *Brothers born of warrior blood: Politics and ethnicity in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press (Pty) Ltd.

- Marè, G., and G. Hamilton. 1987. *An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press (Pty) Ltd.
- Marks, S., and S. Trapido Ed. 1987. *The politics of race, class and nationalism in twentieth century South Africa*. New York: Longman Inc.
- Mashele, P. 2004. Traditional leadership in South Africa's new democracy. *Review of African Political Economy* 31 (100): 349-354.
- Matlosa, K. 2004. *Caught between transition and democratic consolidation: Dilemmas of political change in southern Africa*, eds. C. Landsberg and S. Mackay, 18-39. Cape Town: IDASA.
- Muthien, Y., and M. Khosa. 1995. 'The Kingdom, the Volkstaat and the New South Africa': Drawing South Africa's new regional boundaries. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21 (2): 303-322.
- Myers, J. 1996. Fancy dress: Concealment and ideology in South Africa. *Transformation* 30: 30-46.
- Mzala. 1988. *Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda*. London: Zed Books Ltd.
- Mzizi, J. 2004. *The quest for democratic governance in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, eds. C. Landsberg and S. Mackay, 194-205. Cape Town: IDASA.
- Nnoli, O. 1994. *Ethnicity and democracy in Africa*. Lagos: Malthouse Press LTD.
- Norval, M. 1993. *Politics by other means: The ANC's war on South Africa*. Washington D.C.: Selous Foundation Press.

Osaghae, E. 1994. *Ethnicity and its management in South Africa*. Lagos: Malthouse Press LTD.

Parkin, F. 1982. *Max Weber*. Sussex: Ellis Horwood Limited.

Popper, M. 2000. The development of charismatic leaders. *Political Psychology* 21 (4): 729-744.

Sahay, A., Ed. 1971. *Max Weber and modern sociology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Segal, L. 1992. The human face of violence: Hostel-dwellers speak. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18 (1): 190-231.

Sisk, T. 1995. The uncertain interregnum. In *Democratization in South Africa*, 88-126. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Sitas, A. 1996. The new tribalism: Hostels and violence. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22 (2): 235-248.

South African History Online. N.d. *Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi*.
<http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/buthelezi-mg.htm> (accessed October 10, 2008)

South African Press Association. 1996. *ANC planned to kill Buthelezi in secret operation, truth body told*.
<http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/media/1996/9609/s960905a.htm> (accessed October 12, 2008).

South Africa. Truth & Reconciliation Commission. 1998. Volume 3 Chapter 3.
<http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/3chap3.htm> (accessed October 16, 2008)

- Southall, R. 1986. A note on Inkatha membership. *African Affairs* 85 (341): 573-588.
- Southall, R. 1981. Buthelezi, Inkatha and the politics of compromise. *African Affairs* 80 (321): 453-481.
- Szeftel, M. 1994. Ethnicity and democratization in South Africa. *Review of African political economy* 21 (60): 185-199.
- Temkin, B. 1976. *Buthelezi: Zulu statesman*. Cape Town: Purnell.
- The Presidency: Republic of South Africa. N.d. *Profile of the University of Fort Hare*.
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/orders_list.asp?show=78 (accessed March 21, 2008)
- Thompson, L., and J. Butler Eds. 1975. *Change in contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Turner, S., ed. 2000. *The Cambridge companion to Weber*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- University of KwaZulu-Natal. N.d. Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi.
<http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za:8080/DC/CCSE87.1021.5123.000.000.1987.26/CCSE87.1021.5123.000.000.1987.26.pdf> (accessed: 16 October, 2008).
- Van Kessel, I., and B. Oomen. 1997. 'One chief one vote': The revival of traditional authorities in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *African Affairs* 96 (385): 561-585.
- Van Zyl Slabbert, F. 1989. *The system and the struggle*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Verkuyl, J. N.d. *The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa and the ideology and practice of Apartheid*.
<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/misc/verkuyl.html> (accessed March 22, 2008).

Waetjen, T. 1999. The 'home' in homeland: Gender, national space, and Inkatha's politics of ethnicity.
Ethnic and racial studies 22 (4): 653-678.

Weber, M. 1968. The Types of Legitimate Domination. In *Economy and Society* (Volume 1), Ed. G. Roth,
212-301. New York: Bedminster.

Weber, M. 1947. The Types of Authority and Imperative Co-ordination. In *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, ed. T. Parsons, 297-389. London: William Hodge and Company Limited.

Wiarda, H. 2002. *Comparative Democracy and Democratization*. Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers.

Willner, A. 1984. *The spellbinders: Charismatic political leadership*. New Haven: Yale University Press.